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NOTES
UNITED STATES V. ARMSTRONG: SELECTIVE
PROSECUTION-A FUTILE DEFENSE AND ITS
ARDUOUS STANDARD OF DISCOVERY
Marc Michael'
The United States Government has broad prosecutorial discretion to
enforce the nation's criminal laws, and as a result, courts are reluctant to
subject this discretion to judicial review.' The decision of whether or not
to prosecute in each case, however, is subject to the constraints of the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
2Clause. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits any state from promulgating or enforcing any law that would
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."3 Through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, this admoni-
tion is applicable to the federal government.4 Thus, a prosecutor's deci-
sion to prosecute a specific defendant must not be based upon arbitrary
classifications such as race or religion, in light of the constitutional con-
straints imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480,1486 (1996) (noting that the judi-
ciary is reluctant to review the prosecutor's discretion because the discretion is grounded
in the prosecutor's constitutionally mandated duties); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607 (1985) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.l (1982)); see also
infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text (explaining that the prosecutor's discretion is
founded in and defined by the Constitution).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1490 (stating that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause limits prosecutorial discretion). The Fifth Amendment
states in pertinent part that: "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 n.9 (stating that the Fifth Amendment contains an
equal protection component applicable to the federal government); Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (asserting as identical the Supreme Court's approach
to equal protection claims of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (stating that the Fifth Amendment Due Proc-
ess Clause does not exclude the concept of equal protection).
5. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (stating that "the conscious exercise of
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation [, so long
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In instances of perceived abuses of prosecutorial discretion, a defen-
dant may argue that he was selectively prosecuted.' A defendant's selec-
tive prosecution claim "is not a defense on the merits to the criminal
charge itself," but instead is "an independent assertion that the prosecu-
tor has brought charges" against the defendant for an unconstitutional
reason such as race.7 A successful selective prosecution claim might de-
feat the criminal prosecution.8
The Supreme Court has applied an equal protection analysis to a
prima facie selective prosecution claim, directing a defendant to demon-
strate that the decision to prosecute had a "discriminatory effect and that
it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."9 The Supreme Court has
as,] the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification").
6. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (explaining that the selective prosecution claim
is an assertion that the prosecutor has brought charges against the defendant in violation
of the defendant's constitutional rights).
7. Id.; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
8. See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-89
(implying, in dicta, that a selective prosecution claim might be a complete defense to a
criminal prosecution). But see Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484 n.2. (noting that the Supreme
Court had never determined the appropriate remedy for a successful selective prosecution
claim). In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., the appellant, a corporation that op-
erated a large discount department store in Pennsylvania, sought to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a Sunday closing law based on alleged selective application of the law. See 366
U.S. at 585-86. The Court rejected appellant's claim. See id. at 588-89. The Court ob-
served that "[slince appellant's employees may defend against any such proceeding that is
actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination, we do not believe
that the court below was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunctive powers." Id.
A selective prosecution claim qualifies as a pre-trial objection based upon a defect in the
institution of prosecution. See United States v. Bryant, 5 F.3d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1993).
The claim is waived on appeal unless the defendant raises it before trial. See id. (citing
United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991)).
9. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (stating that selective prosecution claims are correctly
evaluated "according to ordinary equal protection standards"). The Supreme Court has
utilized this two-part equal protection analysis in previous cases involving facially neutral
statutes with discriminatory effects based on race or gender. See Barry Lynn Creech,
Note, And Justice for All: Wayte v. United States and the Defense of Selective Prosecution,
64 N.C. L. REV. 385, 401 (1986). For example, in Washington v. Davis, black applicants
for police officer positions purported racial discrimination based on an employment test
that "excluded" blacks in proportionately greater numbers than whites. See 426 U.S. 229,
232-33 (1976). Applying an equal protection analysis, the Court stated that discriminatory
effect was not the "sole touchstone" of racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitu-
tion. See id. at 242. The Court asserted that a discriminatory purpose also must be
proved, although such purpose need not be express and may be inferred from the "totality
of the relevant facts." Id. at 240-42. The Washington Court, however, refused to infer a
discriminatory purpose of the employment test even though the test had a disproportion-
ately negative impact on black applicants. See id. at 246 (noting the relationship of the test
to police training, the racial composition of the recruit classes, and the affirmative efforts
of the police department to recruit black officers).
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not, however, articulated the necessary showing required of a defendant
for discovery of government materials to bolster the selective prosecu-
tion claim.'0 Instead, the federal circuits were left to determine the
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., a non-
profit real estate developer, who had contracted to purchase a tract of land, alleged racial
discrimination because of the local authorities' refusal to change the tract from a single-
family to a multi-family zone. See 429 U.S. 252, 254-56 (1977). The Court reaffirmed its
holding in Washington, that the disproportionate impact of any official action, while not
determinative, is relevant in the consideration of discriminatory effect. See id. at 264-65.
The Court further required proof of discriminatory purpose as a motivating factor to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 265-66. The Court next identified
objective factors relevant in proving discriminatory intent. See id. at 266-68 (listing such
factors as the impact of the official action, the historical and administrative background,
and any departures from normal practice); see also infra note 101 (providing a list of fac-
tors demonstrative of discriminatory intent as articulated by the Arlington Heights Court).
The Court found that the real estate developer had failed to prove that discriminatory in-
tent motivated the local authorities' decision not to change the classification of the land.
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-70 (observing that the present zoning classification
had existed for seventeen years, that the rezoning request followed standard procedure,
and that the authorities had attempted to accommodate the developer in other ways).
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Supreme Court upheld a
Massachusetts veterans' preference statute that favored qualifying veterans for civil serv-
ice positions over qualifying non-veterans. See 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979). A female civil
servant alleged that "the absolute-preference" statute discriminated against females be-
cause of their sex and consequently violated their equal protection rights. Id. at 259. The
Court conceded the foreseeable adverse consequences of the statute to women. See id. at
278. Yet, the Court stated that, "'[d]iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision
maker.., selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
'not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279 (citation
omitted). The Court ruled that the statute did not deprive women of equal protection be-
cause, under the totality of the circumstances, the law favored veterans of either sex. See
id. at 279-80.
A demonstration of both prongs of the Court's equal protection analysis is not necessary
in all cases. A defendant need not make a demonstration of discriminatory intent in those
rare cases involving an overtly discriminatory classification. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608
n.10 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1880) (involving the system-
atic exclusion of blacks from juries which was itself such unequal application of the law as
to show intentional discrimination)); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (holding that the
Court will infer discriminatory intent from disproportionately adverse effects when the
impact of facially neutral legislation indicates a stark pattern of discrimination); Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (asserting a presumption of racial discrimination
when nearly 400 black voters were excluded from a voting district after redistricting); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (inferring intentional discrimination because the
government directed the enforcement of a laundry ordinance solely at those of Chinese
ancestry); see also infra note 101 (describing situations in which the courts will infer dis-
criminatory intent based upon the severe discriminatory effects of a facially neutral law).
10. Cf Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 n.8 (noting a division in the federal circuits on the se-
lective prosecution claim's prima facie case). In deciding the plaintiff's equal protection
claim, the Court considered only whether the plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case for
selective prosecution. See id. at 606, 610; infra notes 96-125 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's decision in Wayte and its ramifications).
1998)
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threshold showing for such discovery." Not until United States v. Arm-
strong,12 did the Supreme Court determine the necessary standard of dis-
covery in the context of selective prosecution claims."
In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held that in order to
establish the discriminatory effect prong of the selective prosecution test,
a defendant must demonstrate "that similarly situated individuals of a
different race were not prosecuted."' 4 Specifically, the Court held that
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" does not, by itself,
allow a defendant to examine government materials for the preparation
of selective prosecution claims. Instead, the Court ruled that to be enti-
tled to discover government materials to support a selective prosecution
claim, a defendant must make a threshold showing that similarly situated
defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not.7
Discovery is warranted under these circumstances because it tends to
show the existence of the discriminatory effect element of the selective
prosecution claim. 8
On April 21, 1992, the Armstrong respondents were indicted in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California on fed-
11. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1488 (1996). The Armstrong
Court noted that a majority of the circuit courts that had considered the issue in the con-
text of a selective prosecution claim required presentment of some evidence that similarly
situated defendants of different races were not prosecuted. See id.; see also Tobin Ro-
mero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise of
Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043, 2048 n.33 (1996) (noting that in a majority of the circuits,
a defendant is required to demonstrate "a colorable basis of selective prosecution;" some
evidence tending to prove the selective prosecution claim).
12. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 1487.
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Rule 16 provides:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to in-
spect the copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of [the defendant's] defense or are intended for use by the govern-
ment as evidence in chief at .the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the de-
fendant.
Id. 16(a)(1)(C).
16. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
17. See id. at 1489; see also infra notes 178-94 and accompanying text (explaining the
Armstrong Court's analysis on the threshold of discovery for selective prosecution claims).
18. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488 (noting that "we consider what evidence consti-
tutes 'some evidence tending to show the existence' of the discriminatory effect element"
(quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207,1211 (2d Cir. 1974))).
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eral crack and firearms offenses.' 9 All of the respondents indicted were
black.20 In response to their indictments, the respondents filed a motion
for discovery, or alternatively, for dismissal, alleging that the respon-
dents' race motivated the prosecutor's decision to prosecute in federal
court.21 The district court granted the respondents' discovery motion
22
and dismissed the case when the government refused to comply with the
discovery order.23 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed.2
The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc to define the
proper standard governing discovery for a selective prosecution claim.
In a seven-to-four decision, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel reversed the
decision of the three-judge panel and affirmed the district court's discov-
16
ery order. The en banc panel held that a defendant seeking to obtain
discovery must demonstrate a colorable basis of selective prosecution,
but is not required to demonstrate that similarly situated defendants who
could have been prosecuted were not.27
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit en banc panel's affir-
mance of the district court's discovery order, concluding that the evi-
dence presented by the respondents failed to demonstrate the essential
elements of a selective prosecution claim. The Court stated that the re-
spondents were required to show the government did not prosecute oth-
ers who were similarly situated who were a different race.29 The respon-
dents had identified those of the same race who were prosecuted, but
19. See id. at 1483; see also infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (explaining the
factual circumstances and statutory law underlying the respondent's offenses).
20. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483.
21. See id. Respondents attached to their motion a Paralegal's affidavit and a study
that demonstrated that as of 1991, every federal crack case tried by the Office of the Fed-
eral Public Defender involved a black defendant. See id.; see also infra note 164 and ac-
companying text (explaining the study submitted by the respondents).
22. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484; see also infra note 166 and accompanying text
(explaining the district court's decision to grant the respondents' motion for discovery).
23. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484; see also infra note 168 and accompanying text
(explaining the scope of the district court's order and its reasoning).
24. See United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en banc,
48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); see also infra notes
174-75 and accompanying text (outlining the justifications for the Ninth Circuit's reversal).
25. See United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). The Ninth Circuit resolved the case en banc. See id
26. See id. at 1516.
27. See id.; see also infra note 174 and accompanying text (surveying the en banc
court's articulation of the threshold for discovery).
28. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
29. See id. at 1488.
19981
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failed to identify similarly situated individuals who were not black, who
could have been prosecuted under the same charges as respondents, but
were not.3° Thus, because the respondents were not entitled to additional
discovery, the Court ruled that their evidence in the district court failed
to demonstrate that an abuse of prosecutorial discretion resulted in their
selection for federal crack and firearm offenses.31 Likewise, Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure32 did not authorize the respon-
dents to examine government documents when preparing selective
prosecution claims.33 In its review of the respondents' prima facie case of
selective prosecution, the Armstrong Court held that in order to establish
the discriminatory effect prong of the test, the respondents must suffi-
ciently demonstrate that similarly situated individuals of different races
from the respondents could have been prosecuted, but were not.
34
The Court justified such a high threshold for discovery in selective
prosecution claims on the premise that a majority of the federal circuits
required a defendant to establish that the government failed to prosecute
others similarly situated.3" The majority defended its contention that
Rule 16 did not entitle the respondents to greater discovery rights in se-
lective prosecution claims, asserting that the Rule applied only to an ex-
amination of government documents for defense against the govern-
ment's case-in-chief.3 6 Accordingly, the Court deemed the demonstration
of the discriminatory effect prong of the prima facie case of selective
prosecution through evidence of similarly situated persons to be consis-
tent with ordinary equal protection requirements. 7
This Note examines the development of the selective prosecution
claim, in particular, its relation to the broad constitutional grant of
30. See id. at 1489. The en banc panel noted that a claim of selective prosecution
raises an implicit suspicion that an unconstitutional selection has occurred and that, there-
fore, the respondents need not demonstrate a comparison pool of similarly situated indi-
viduals of different races in order to obtain discovery. See id. at 1488.
31. See id. at 1489. Absent evidence that similarly situated defendants could have
been prosecuted, but were not, the respondents' claim that they were selected unconstitu-
tionally for prosecution due to their race had no basis. See id.; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 184-87 (illustrating the deficiencies of the respondents' case).
32. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
33. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485; see also infra notes 188-94 and accompanying
text (explaining the Armstrong Court's interpretation of Rule 16).
34. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
35. See id. at 1488; see also infra note 182 (illustrating the holdings of the circuit
courts of appeals which have considered the threshold of discovery in the context of selec-
tive prosecution cases).
36. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485; see also infra notes 191-94 and accompanying
text (explaining the symmetry of Rule 16's language).
37. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
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prosecutorial discretion and the evolution of its threshold of discovery.
First, this Note demonstrates the nexus between the broad grant of
prosecutorial discretion and the stringent requirements of the selective
prosecution claim. Next, this Note argues that the Supreme Court has
pronounced an articulable selective prosecution claim while failing to
address the requisite threshold showing for discovery to support the
claim. This Note then asserts that Armstrong refines the selective prose-
cution claim to correspond with ordinary equal protection standards,
while requiring a strict threshold of discovery. This Note concludes that
Armstrong's treatment of the discovery threshold is exacting, effectively
making discovery of governmental materials impossible given the requi-
site evidentiary showing defendants are required to make.
I. THE BROAD GRANT OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The Constitution grants the executive branch broad prosecutorial dis-
cretion to enforce the nation's laws.3 8 Thus, the judicial branch is disin-
clined to scrutinize exercises of that executive discretion.3 9 In the ordi-
nary case, the decision to prosecute and the choice of what charge to
bring rests entirely with the prosecutor.4° "[I]n the absence of clear evi-
38. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Constitution grants this power to prosecutors
because they are charged with the responsibility to help the President discharge his consti-
tutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. The United States
Code also codifies grants of prosecutorial discretion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547 (1994).
The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 516 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or
is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." Id. § 516. The full text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 547 provides that:
Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his
district, shall-
(1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States;
(2) prosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil actions, suits or pro-
ceedings in which the United States is concerned;
(3) appear in behalf of the defendants in all civil actions, suits or proceed-
ings pending in his district against collectors, or other officers of the revenue or
customs for any act done by them or for the recovery of any money exacted by or
paid to these officers, and by them paid into the Treasury;
(4) institute and prosecute proceedings for the collection of fines, penalties,
and forfeitures incurred for violation of any revenue law, unless satisfied on in-
vestigation that justice does not require the proceedings; and
(5) make such reports as the Attorney General may direct.
Id. § 547.
39. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (recognizing the reluctance
of the judiciary to involve itself in the review of prosecutorial discretion).
40. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecu-
tor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by stat-
1998]
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dence to the contrary," therefore, courts will assume that prosecutors
"properly discharged their official duties.,'41
Selective prosecution claims require courts to exercise judicial power
over a special province of the executive branch, namely, the power to en-
force the nation's criminal laws.4'2 Thus, given the broad grant of prose-
cutorial discretion,43 a defendant must present "clear evidence to the con-
trary" to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal
protection guarantees."
Courts are particularly hesitant to probe the government's decision to
prosecute for several reasons.45  First, the decision to prosecute is ill-
suited to judicial review."6 Second, judicial scrutiny of a prosecutor's de-
ute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."); see also Town of Newton v. Ru-
mery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (stating that "courts normally must defer to prosecutorial
decisions as to whom to prosecute"); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11
(1982) (affirming the Bordenkircher Court's broad allocation of prosecutorial protection,
and stating that the "validity of a pretrial charging decision must be measured against the
broad discretion held by the prosecutor to select the charges against an accused"); Mar-
shall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (stating that the "legal system has tradition-
ally accorded wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement process"); United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (stating that it is within the prosecutor's dis-
cretion "[wihether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury").
41. United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). In an adversar-
ial legal system, federal prosecutors need not act as a detached and disinterested party in
the exercise of prosecutorial duties. See Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. at 248. Given the constitu-
tional interests at stake, prosecutors are "permitted to be zealous in the [] enforcement of
the law." See id. Those interests include an "accurate finding of facts and application of
law, and [the preservation of] a fair and open process for decision." Id.
Some commentators, however, have criticized the judicial deference granted to prosecu-
tors in the exercise of prosecutorial power. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File
Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 246, 303 (1980) (questioning which branch is best suited to make prosecutorial deci-
sions). See generally James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1554-60 (1981) (arguing that the existing prosecutorial discretion
system is too expansive and interferes with the fair and equal administration of justice).
42. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (stating that the decision of a
federal prosecutor to indict lies exclusively with the executive branch because the Execu-
tive is charged by the Constitution to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
43. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (explaining the deference granted
by the judiciary to prosecutors regarding the execution of the prosecutor's duties).
44. Chemical Found, Inc., 272 U.S. at 14-15.
45. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08; see also infra note 46-47 (listing the problems and
costs of judicial review pronounced by the Wayte Court regarding a prosecutor's decision
to prosecute).
46. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. Regarding decisions to prosecute, the Wayte Court
enunciated specific considerations that the judiciary could not adequately review. See id.
The pronounced factors included: (1) "the strength of the case;" (2) "the prosecution's
general deterrence value;" (3) "the Government's enforcement priorities;" and (4) "the
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cision to file charges imposes systematic costs on the criminal justice sys-
tem.47 A prosecutor's discretion, however, is not completely unfettered;S 481
it is limited by important constitutional constraints. One such con-
straint is the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.4 ' Thus, the government's decision to prosecute may not
be based on improper racial classifications." The selective prosecution
claim is one way a defendant can successfully demonstrate an equal pro-
tection violation through evidence of discriminate administration of a
criminal law.5
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SELECTIVE
PROSECUTION DEFENSE
A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins: The Origin of the Selective Prosecution Claim
Constitutionally recognized equal protection standards govern selec-
tive prosecution claims. 2 The Supreme Court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"
case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan." Id.
47. See id. The Wayte Court articulated three specific costs incurred when the judici-
ary examines the prosecutor's decision to prosecute. See id. The first cost concerns the
potential delay of the underlying criminal proceeding. See id. Examination of a prosecu-
tor's charging decision diverts the criminal proceedings from the central issue of deter-
mining the defendant's guilt or sustaining the defendant's innocence, resulting in delay
that can be damaging to the criminal process. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325 (1940) (noting that the swift enforcement of the criminal law promotes the ad-
ministration of justice, whereas delay undermines that administration). The second cost
articulated by the Wayte Court concerned the chilling effect on law enforcement caused by
judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging decisions. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. Finally,
the Court noted that judicial inquiry of charging decisions would undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness because such inquiry entailed the disclosure of prosecutorial strategy. See id.
48. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (stating that the prose-
cutor's discretion is subject to constitutional constraints).
49. Cf. Bolting v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (noting that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is a safeguard against unfair discrimination); see also supra note 2 (quoting the
pertinent text of the Fifth Amendment regarding the prohibition on the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law).
50. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also supra note 5 and accompa-
nying text (listing the unjustifiable standards that may not be considered in the decision to
prosecute).
51. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (invalidating a criminal or-
dinance making wooden laundry operations unlawful upon evidence that solely persons of
Chinese ancestry were prosecuted). Yick Wo involved a facially neutral ordinance regu-
lating public laundry facilities. See id. at 357. Given the disparate administration of the
ordinance, the Court found that the government had violated the plaintiff's equal protec-
tion rights. See id. at 373-74.
52. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (stating that selective prosecution claims are governed
by "ordinary equal protection standards").
53. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
1998]
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first considered the requisite equal protection standard applicable to a
selective prosecution claim. 4 The Supreme Court held that absent proof
of an explicit discriminatory classification in a criminal law, a defendant
successfully may challenge a selective prosecution under the law if he
demonstrates that the law had discriminatory effects.5 That is, the ordi-
nance will be held violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the defen-
dant demonstrates that persons of different races in "similar circum-
stances" were not prosecuted under the ordinance. 6 In addition, the
defendant must demonstrate that the government's intent to discriminate
against members of the defendant's race resulted in the difference in
prosecutorial treatment .
In Yick Wo, a San Francisco ordinance made it unlawful to maintain a
wooden laundry operation without the consent of the City board of su-
pervisors." Persons of Chinese ancestry owned approximately 240 of the
total 320 laundry operations in San Francisco. 9 About 310 of the total
number of laundries were constructed of wood.6° The plaintiff, Yick Wo,
and more than 150 of his countrymen, were arrested for violating the or-
dinance while others, who were not of Chinese ancestry and who main-
tained laundry facilities under "similar conditions" to Yick Wo, were not
arrested.6' Although neutral on its face, the statistical evidence demon-
strated that the ordinance was applied in a discriminatory fashion.62 That
evidence revealed that the government prosecuted only those of Chinese
descent.63
The Supreme Court held that when a facially neutral statute is directed
exclusively towards members of one race, those persons are denied equal
protection under the law.64 Accordingly, because the government offered
no rational explanation for its discriminatory administration of the ordi-
nance, the government intentionally discriminated against Yick Wo and
54. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996) (explaining that the
origins of the selective prosecution claim and its requisite prongs stemmed from the
Court's holding in Yick Wo).
55. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 374.
58. See id. at 357 (noting that the ordinance regulated the type of building used to
operate a laundry facility).
59. See id. at 358-59.
60. See id. at 359.
61. See id.
62. See id. (providing statistical evidence of the discriminatory application).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 373.
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members of his race.65 The discriminatory application of the ordinance
demonstrated its discriminatory effect.66 The Court, therefore, struck
down the ordinance as unconstitutional.67
B. Ah Sin v. Wittman: Evidence of Similarly Situated Defendants
Required to Demonstrate Selective Prosecution
Several decades later, the Supreme Court further developed the simi-
larly situated requirement for the discriminatory effect prong of the se-
lective prosecution defense in Ah Sin v. Wittman.68 The City of San
Francisco imprisoned Ah Sin, a subject of China, alleging that he vio-
lated a county ordinance prohibiting gambling tables in barricaded
rooms.
69 Ah Sin petitioned a California state court for a writ of habeas• • 70
corpus, seeking release from imprisonment. In the habeas corpus peti-
tion, Ah Sin alleged that only citizens of Chinese ancestry were subjected
to the ordinance in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.7' The Su-
preme Court rejected the equal protection claim because Ah Sin's peti-
tion did not allege that the ordinance was facially neutral, or that other
similarly situated offenders of different races were not subjected to the
ordinance.
65. See id. at 374. The government presented no justification for the discriminatory
administration of the ordinance. The Court thereby concluded that no rational reason for
the discriminatory administration existed, except hostility toward Yick Wo's race. See id.
66. See id. Armstrong interpreted the Yick Wo Court's language of "similar condi-
tions" as parallel to the concept of "similarly situated," and, accordingly, demonstrative of
the discriminatory effect prong of the selective prosecution claim; cf United States v.
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996) (asserting that evidence presented in Yick Wo re-
garding the operation of laundries "under similar conditions" as those run by people of
Chinese ancestry but which were not subject to the ordinance amounted to a demonstra-
tion of similarly situated defendants who could have been prosecuted but were not).
67. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
68. 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
69. See id. at 503. The ordinance prohibited the use of gambling tables in a room
barred or barricaded for purposes of thwarting police access and intervention. See id.
70. See id. at 504-05. A writ of habeas corpus enables a party to be brought before a
court or judge to secure release from unlawful imprisonment. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990) (citing People ex reL Luciano v. Murphy, 290 N.Y.S. 1011,
1016 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1936)). The scope of the writ covers all constitutional challenges.
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963).
71. See Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 507.
72. See id. at 507-08. The Court noted that Ah Sin did not allege that solely those of
Chinese Ancestry were subjected to the ordinance or that other similarly situated offend-
ers of other races or national origins were not subjected to it. Id Therefore, the Court
concluded that there was no violation of Ah Sin's right to equal protection guaranteed un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 508 (noting that in Yick Wo, the constitutional
challenge was successful because convincing evidence existed of the discriminatory appli-
cation of the criminal ordinance); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (explaining
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Ah Sin's petition amounted to mere allegations of the discriminatory
effect of the ordinance without supporting evidence.7 ' The Court distin-
guished Ah Sin from Yick Wo, noting that Yick Wo had demonstrated
discriminatory administration of a criminal ordinance through credible
evidence of the government's administration of the law. 74 Thus, the Ah
Sin Court held that the discriminatory administration of a law is ulti-
mately a "matter of proof," the burden of which rests upon the charging
plaintiff.75 Ah Sin presented no such evidence of the ordinance's dis-
. • 76
criminatory administration. The Court thereby determined that the
plaintiff failed to establish the requisite elements of a selective prosecu-
tion claim.77
C. Oyler v. Boles: Arbitrary Classifications, Discriminatory Intent, and a
Prima Facie Case for Selective Prosecution
It was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court again addressed the issue
of selective prosecution in the case of Oyler v. Boles.78  The Supreme
Court held that some selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws does
not violate the equal protection guarantee unless a defendant demon-
the deficiencies of Ah Sin's evidence of his selective prosecution claim).
73. See Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 507; see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (noting
that Ah Sin presented no evidence of the criminal ordinance's discriminatory application).
74. See Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 507.
75. See id. at 508. The Ah Sin Court necessitated evidence of similarly situated of-
fenders to demonstrate discriminatory administration of a criminal ordinance, stating:
No latitude of intention should be indulged in a case like this. There should be
certainty to every intent. Plaintiff in error seeks to set aside a criminal law of the
State, not on the ground that it is unconstitutional on its face, not that it is dis-
criminatory in tendency and ultimate actual operation as the ordinance was
which was passed on in the Yick Wo case, but that it was made so by the manner
of its administration. This is a matter of proof, and no fact should be omitted to
make it out completely, when the power of a Federal court is invoked to interfere
with the course of criminal justice of a State.
Id. Ah Sin failed to offer proof of discriminatory administration and the Court, therefore,
rejected his claim. See id.
76. Cf id. at 507 (stating that Ah Sin did not allege that other similarly situated of-
fenders of different races were not subjected to the ordinance). Ah Sin presented no evi-
dence of a statistical disparity between those of Chinese ancestry who were convicted un-
der the ordinance and those who were not of Chinese ancestry who were not convicted
under the ordinance. See id. at 506 (alleging only "'[t]hat said ordinance and the provi-
sions thereof are enforced and executed ... solely and exclusively against persons of the
Chinese race, and not otherwise"'). Ah Sin's equal protection defense amounted to a
mere assumption of discriminatory administration given the lack of evidence of such ad-
ministration. See id. at 507-08. In contrast, Yick Wo presented evidence to the Court
showing that only those of Chinese ancestry were charged with operating wooden laun-
dries and was more successful in his claim. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
77. See Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 508.
78. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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strates that "the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification., 79 Al-
though the Court never mentioned the phrase "selective prosecution" in
its opinion, it announced the requisite showing necessary to demonstrate
discriminatory intent of the claim."s
In this consolidated case, the petitioners William Oyler and Paul Crab-
tree, were serving life sentences under West Virginia's habitual offender
statute.81 The petitioners filed separate writs of habeas corpus in the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The Taylor County Circuit
Court of West Virginia convicted William Oyler of second degree mur-
der on February 5, 1953.83 During Oyler's sentencing, the West Virginia
prosecuting attorney alleged that Oyler had been convicted of three prior
offenses in Pennsylvania which were punishable by imprisonment.4 The
Court agreed with the prosecutor and imposed a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment under West Virginia's habitual offender statute .
Paul Crabtree pleaded guilty to check forgery in West Virginia.86 The
state court deferred sentencing and the prosecuting attorney subse-
79. Id. at 456.
80. See id. In order to prove discriminatory intent, a defendant must prove that an
unconstitutional consideration, such as the defendant's race, motivated the prosecutor's
decision to bring charges. See Romero, supra note 11, at 2047.
81. See Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 449. West Virginia's habitual criminal statute mandates
the imposition of a life sentence upon a third conviction "of a crime punishable by con-
finement in a penitentiary." W. VA. CODE § 6130 (1961) (current version at § 61-11-18
(1992)). Actual imprisonment for prior convictions is not required under the statute. See
State ex rel. Johnson v. Skeen, 87 S.E.2d 521, 523-24 (W. Va. 1955) (interpreting the stat-
ute as requiring only that imprisonment in a penitentiary could have been imposed for pre-
vious convictions). The prosecuting attorney files an information upon conviction and be-
fore sentencing to invoke the penalty. W. VA. CODE § 6131 (1961) (current version at
§ 61-11-19 (1992)).
82. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 449. Without elaborating, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia denied both Oyler's and Crabtree's petitions. See id. Oyler's petition
appealing the judgment alleged that West Virginia's statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause because it had been applied only to a small number
of those offenders who could have been subject to its provisions. See id. Crabtree also
claimed an equal protection violation in his writ. See id. at 451; see also supra note 70
(providing general background on the writ of habeas corpus).
83. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 449.
84. See id. at 450.
85. See id.; see also supra note 81 (explaining West Virginia's habitual offender stat-
ute). Oyler admitted to the Court the accuracy of the information, even after his attorney
cautioned him of the ramifications of admitting such facts. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 450. The
Court imposed the statutorily mandated life sentence, recommending Oyler be paroled as
soon as possible. See id.
86. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 450. Check forgery was punishable by a sentence of two to
ten years imprisonment. See id.
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quently discovered that Crabtree had been convicted of two previous
felonies. 7 Crabtree admitted his prior convictions in open court, and the
judge sentenced him to life imprisonment under West Virginia's habitual
offender statute.88  Both Oyler and Crabtree asserted Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection violations. 89 Both petitioners alleged that
the trial courts selectively applied West Virginia's habitual offender stat-
ute]0
The United States Supreme Court rejected the contention that the pe-
titioners had suffered an equal protection violation.9 The statistics of-
fered by the petitioners showed only that a high percentage of those eli-
gible for the habitual offender statute were not sentenced under the
statute]2 Furthermore, the Court stated that mere selectivity in en-
forcement of a criminal law was not in itself a violation of equal protec-
tion without evidence that race, religion, or some other arbitrary classifi-
cation motivated the selective practices.93 Both petitioners failed to
assert that they intentionally were selected and subjected to the habitual
offender statute because they did not fall within any of those arbitrary
classifications.94 Thus, Oyler and Crabtree's equal protection claims
failed. 95
87. See id. (noting that Crabtree had been convicted in the states of Washington and
West Virginia).
88. See id. at 451; see also supra note 81 (illustrating the instances in which West Vir-
ginia's habitual offender statute imposes a life sentence).
89. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 454; supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining that
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause is applicable when a state denies a
person the equal protection of the laws).
90. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 455. In his petition, Oyler presented evidence that during a
15-year period in the Taylor County Circuit Court, six men were habitual offenders as de-
fined under the habitual offender statute but were not sentenced accordingly. See id. at
454-55. While the other five men had three or more prior adult felony convictions, Oyler's
former convictions concerned juvenile offenses. See id. at 455. Oyler also presented evi-
dence that as many as 904 men in West Virginia were habitual offenders but were not sen-
tenced as the habitual offender statute mandated. See id. In support of the latter allega-
tion, Oyler attached statistical data based upon prison records. See id. In his petition,
Crabtree presented similar statistical evidence. See id.
91. See id. at 456.
92. See id. No evidence existed to suggest that the records of those with prior convic-
tions who were not sentenced under the statute were available to the prosecutors. See id.
Thus, the prosecutor's lack of knowledge of those prior convictions of those persons ex-
cused the failure to prosecute those persons. See id. The Court held that a failure to
prosecute others because of a lack of knowledge of their prior offenses did not violate
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection standards. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. (observing that statistical implications of selective enforcement alone are
not sufficient evidence of deliberate selection).
95. See id.
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D. Wayte v. United States: A Modern Claim for Selective Prosecution
Defined: Discriminatory Effect and Discriminatory Intent
It was not until Wayte v. United States, 96 that the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated the modern criterion for the selective prosecution defense.
97
Constitutionally recognized equal protection standards govern selective
prosecution claims.98 In order to prove a selective prosecution claim, the
defendant must show that the government's enforcement of a facially
neutral law had a discriminatory effect and the enforcement was moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose." To prove the first prong of the test,
that of discriminatory effect, the defendant must demonstrate that others
similarly situated to the defendant have not been prosecuted.'0 To es-
tablish the second prong, that of discriminatory intent or purpose, the de-
fendant must prove selection for prosecution based on an impermissible
reason such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'
96. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
97. See id. at 608.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 608 (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
100. Cf. id. at 609-10 (stating that the discriminatory effect prong cannot be demon-
strated if the government treated the defendant and others subject to the same offense
similarly).
101. See id. at 608. Proof of discriminatory intent, therefore, requires a demonstration
that the prosecutor selected the defendant "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,"' that unjustifiable classification. Id. at 610 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Proof of intent may be demonstrated through direct or
circumstantial evidence. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976); Ro-
mero, supra note 11, at 2047. The Arlington Heights Court articulated seven factors that
courts should consider as circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. See 429
U.S. at 266-68. The first factor involves disparities in the administration of the law. See id.
at 266. A disparity can arise where a "clear pattern" of discriminatory effect emerges from
state action based on facially neutral legislation. See id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373 (1886) (noting that only the hostility of those administering a facially neutral
criminal ordinance explained the circumstantial evidence that only those of Chinese ances-
try were prosecuted under the ordinance). In cases involving a significant statistical dis-
parity, discriminatory intent is demonstrated when no justifiable explanation for the gov-
ernment's administration of the facially neutral law exists. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 266 & n.13; David L. Lock, Note, Constitutional Law-Passive Enforcement of Draft
Registration: Does It Constitute Selective Prosecution in Violation of Equal Protection Be-
cause It Discriminates Against Persons Based on Their Exercise of First Amendment
Rights?-United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, Wayte v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984), 57 TEMP. L.Q. 671, 677 n.47 (1984) (stating that
courts will infer a discriminatory intent from the discriminatory effect of state action only
in instances of grave equal protection deprivations). Thus, no other evidence of discrimi-
natory intent is required in those rare cases involving overtly discriminatory classifications.
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The facts underlying Wayte involved a Presidential Proclamation is-
sued by President Jimmy Carter02 which required a certain class of males
born during 1960 to register with the Selective Service System.1° Peti-
tioner Wayte fell within that class of males but, nonetheless, failed to
register' 4 Instead, petitioner wrote letters to government officials, in-
cluding the President, stating his intention not to register.105 His letters
were placed in a Selective Service file containing information of men
who disclosed their intent not to register or who were reported as failing
to register. 10 6 The Selective Service maintained a policy of "passive en-
forcement," consisting of investigating and prosecuting only those non-
See Creech, supra note 9, at 401 n.135. Such cases are rare, however. See Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. Evidence of discriminatory effect alone will not satisfy the equal
protection claim's discriminatory intent prong if the pattern of discriminatory administra-
tion is not as severe as that in Yick Wo. See id. Other circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
natory intent, therefore, must be produced. See id.
Other evidence of discriminatory intent includes the historical background of the legis-
lature's decision to institute a facially neutral law. See id. at 267. This factor proves par-
ticularly relevant if it uncovers objectionable purposes underlying the official action. See
id. A third factor includes the sequence of events leading up to the decision. See id. A
fourth factor includes deviations from ordinary procedures. See id. A fifth factor includes
the decision maker's substantive departure from normal considerations in the decision
making. See id. A sixth factor includes the legislative or administrative history. See id. at
268. Finally, direct testimony by the decision maker also can be considered evidence of
discriminatory intent, although consideration of direct testimony of the decision maker is
utilized in only extraordinary circumstances. See id. The Arlington Heights Court advo-
cated avoidance of judicial inquiry into the motivations of the legislative or executive
branches, as it represented an encroachment on the other branches of government. See id.
at 268 n.18 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971)). The Court also noted the non-exhaustive nature of the potential factors of cir-
cumstantial evidence demonstrating discriminatory intent. See id. at 268.
102. See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981) (providing the guidelines of regis-
tration for the draft applicable to male citizens over the age of eighteen). President Jimmy
Carter issued the Proclamation pursuant to his authority under the Military Selective
Service Act. See Military Selective Service Act § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453(a) (1994). This
section provides that:
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other
male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the
first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and
place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of
the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Id.
103. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 601.
104. See id.
105. See id. Wayte stated: "I will never register for your draft," in his letter to the
President. Id. at 601 n.2. Wayte also stated he would "'be traveling the na-
tion.., encouraging resistance and spreading the word about peace and disarmament."'
Id.
106. See id. at 601.
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registration cases contained in the file.1°7 The Selective Service wrote to
each reported violator in accordance with this policy;' °8 Wayte did not re-
spond to this letter1 9
The Selective Service sent to the United States Department of Justice
the names of Wayte and others identified for investigation and potential
prosecution under the passive enforcement system.110 The Department
of Justice referred those names to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(F.B.I.) for further examination.11' The United States Attorneys for the
districts in which the nonregistrants resided also were notified.112 Conse-
quently, the United States Attorney indicted Wayte for intentionally
"failing to register with the Selective Service.
''
13
Wayte moved to dismiss the indictment on selective prosecution
grounds, arguing that he and other indicted nonregistrants were "vocal"
opponents of the draft who were intentionally targeted for prosecution
because they had exercised their First Amendment rights.14 The District
Court for the Central District of California granted Wayte's request for
discovery and ordered government officials to produce documents.11 5
107. See id.
108. See id. The letter explained to each nonregistrant his duty to register and re-
quested that each person either comply with the law or explain why he had not registered.
See id. at 602. The letter also contained a warning that a violation of the law could result
in criminal prosecution. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. The United States Attorney for the Central District of California sent a
letter to Wayte requesting registration and threatening prosecution for failure to do so
pursuant to a "beg" policy in which F.B.I. agents and United States Attorneys would at-
tempt to persuade nonregistrants to register. See id. Wayte refused to respond even after
the President extended the period to comply with the law, and after F.B.I agents inter-
viewed him. See id. at 602-03.
The Department of Justice recognized that under the passive enforcement system, non-
registrants were liable to be either "vocal proponents" against the draft or "persons with
moral or religious objections." Id. at 603. The Department of Justice further acknowl-
edged that prosecutions under the passive enforcement system could result in counter-
claims involving violations of the nonregistrants' constitutional rights. See id. The De-
partment sought indictments of those nonregistrants who continued to refuse to register
after the Department became aware that the Selective Service could not speedily initiate
an active enforcement system. See id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 604. Of 286 nonregistrants, 13 were indicted. See id. at 604 n.3 (noting
that the rest "either registered, were.., not ... subject to registration requirements,
could not be found, or were under continuing investigation"). An estimated 674,000 non-
registrants were not subject to the passive enforcement system. See id. at 604.
115. See id. The government, arguing executive privilege, declined to comply fully
with the district court's discovery order and moved for a dismissal of the indictment so
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that
Wayte had not satisfied the discriminatory intent prong of the selective
prosecution test.1"6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari n7 on the issue
of whether the passive enforcement policy amounted to the selective
prosecution of persons who articulated their intent not to register for the
draft.'
After articulating the criteria for the selective prosecution test, the Su-
preme Court determined that Wayte had not satisfied either prong. 9
Wayte failed to establish discriminatory effect as he presented no evi-
dence of similarly situated persons who could have been prosecuted, but
were not. 2° Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of discriminatory• 1 2 1
intent. Wayte failed to demonstrate that his prosecution resulted from
an impermissible consideration. 122 The Court, therefore, concluded that
the passive enforcement system did not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment.2 The indictments were upheld
solely on the ground that Wayte had failed to prove both elements of the
that it could appeal the discovery order. See id. The district court dismissed the indict-
ment because the government failed to rebut the selective prosecution claim. See id. at
604-05. The district court articulated the standards for selective prosecution as: (1) dis-
criminatory effect proved through evidence of similarly situated defendants who were not
prosecuted; and (2) discriminatory intent demonstrated by evidence that impermissible
considerations motivated the selection. See id. at 605.
116. See id. at 606. The Ninth Circuit found no evidence that impermissible considera-
tions influenced Wayte's prosecution. See id. (asserting that the government's application
of the passive enforcement system was justified because the nonregistrants were either
unreported and remained unknown or reported and expressly refused to register for the
draft).
117. See Wayte v. United States, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984) (stating order granting certio-
rari).
118. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
119. See id. at 610 (concluding that a selective prosecution claim fails absent a showing
of both discriminatory effect and purpose).
120. See id. The government treated the 286 reported nonregistrants in a similar
fashion. See id. (noting the similarity in the government's investigation and prosecution
of nonregistrants and vocal nonregistrants such as Wayte).
121. See id.
122. Cf id. (stating that the evidence demonstrated only that the government had
knowledge of the consequences of the passive enforcement policy; the prosecution of vo-
cal nonregistrants). No evidence existed that the government intentionally selected Wayte
for prosecution due to his speech. See id. at 610-11. The speech in question consisted of
the letters Wayte had sent to government officials and the President. See id. at 601 n.2; see
also supra note 105 (explaining the general content of the letters). However, at least one
commentator has suggested that the totality of the circumstances exhibited the govern-
ment's discriminatory intent. See Creech, supra note 9, at 405.
123. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 614; see also supra note 4 (explaining the application of the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment to the federal government).
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selective prosecution claim.2 The Court, however, did not consider the
issue of Wayte's right to discover government documents in order to
support his selective prosecution claim.1 2 '
E. Hunter v. Underwood: Demonstration of a Successful Selective
Prosecution Claim
The Supreme Court again applied the selective prosecution analysis in
Hunter v. Underwood.126 The Supreme Court invalidated a provision of
the Alabama Constitution of 1901 that disenfranchised persons convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude.'27 Pursuant to the Alabama Consti-
124. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610.
125. Cf. id. at 614-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that Wayte demonstrated
enough evidence to warrant discovery of government documents relevant to his selective
prosecution claim and that, therefore, the Court improperly dismissed that claim). Justice
Marshall's dissent asserted that the issue before the Court should have been confined to
whether Wayte had produced enough evidence to warrant discovery of governmental ma-
terial in relation to the Selective Service's passive enforcement policy. The Court refused
to consider whether the plaintiff was entitled to government documents relevant to the
claim of selective prosecution because the discovery issue was not raised at any stage of
the appellate proceedings. See id. at 605 n.5 (noting that the issue was neither raised in the
petition for certiorari, briefed on the merits, nor raised at oral argument). Justice Mar-
shall, however, argued that the Court was empowered to consider the threshold for dis-
covery necessary for selective prosecution even if the plaintiff had not requested that the
Court contemplate the discovery issue. See id. at 622-23 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Marshall stated that:
[I]t is curious that the Court here professes such concern about whether the dis-
covery issue was properly presented. Indeed, the Court chooses to address
Wayte's claim that the prosecution scheme placed a direct burden on the exercise
of First Amendment rights. That claim was not presented or ruled upon by the
District Court, was not presented or ruled upon on appeal, and was not raised in
Wayte's petition for certiorari.
Id. at 622 n.1 (citation omitted). Justice Marshall asserted that to prevail on the discovery
issue, Wayte need only show "that the District Court applied the correct legal standard
and did not abuse its discretion in determining that [Wayte] had made a non-frivolous
showing of selective prosecution entitling him to discovery." Id. at 615. Justice Marshall
concluded that the district court correctly resolved the discovery issue. See id. Justice
Marshall argued that the Supreme Court could not reject Wayte's claim on the merits
given Wayte's limited access to evidence without discovery. See id. at 621. Justice Mar-
shall asserted a "colorable basis" showing as the proper threshold for discovery in a selec-
tive prosecution claim. See id. at 623. A defendant must present specific non-frivolous
facts that demonstrate the merits of the claim in order to make a "colorable basis" show-
ing. See id. at 623 (citing United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473,475 (6th Cir. 1983)).
126. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
127. See id. at 233; ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901), repealed by amend, no. 579.
Section 182 of the 1901 Alabama Constitution provides in part:
The following persons shall be disqualified both from registering, and from
voting, namely:
All idiots and insane persons; those who shall by reason of conviction of crime
be disqualified from voting at the time of the ratification of this Constitution;
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tution, the Board of Registrars for Montgomery and Jefferson Counties
blocked Carmen Edwards, a black, and Victor Underwood, a white, from
voter polls because each had been convicted of bouncing a check.1 2 Ed-
wards and Underwood sued the Montgomery and Jefferson Boards of
Registrars under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981129 and 1983130 for civil rights violations,
requesting an invalidation of the constitutional provision and an injunc-
tion against any future application.13' Edwards claimed that the Alabama
constitutional framers intentionally adopted the disenfranchisement pro-
vision to exclude blacks from voting based on race, and that the provi-
sion advanced that intended effect.1
32
those who shall be convicted of treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfea-
sance in office, larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money
under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of perjury, robbery, assault with in-
tent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and battery on the wife, bigamy,
living in adultery, sodomy, incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or
any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any infamous
crime or crime involving moral turpitude ....
ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901). Disenfranchisment occurred by blocking those con-
victed for crimes involving moral turpitude from the voter polls. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at
224.
128. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223-24. The Board of Registrars relied on the Alabama
Attorney General's opinion in determining that crimes of moral turpitude included the
misdemeanor of bouncing a check. See id. at 224.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). This statute guarantees all persons of different races the
same legal rights. See id. Section 1981(a) states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
Id. § 1981(a).
130. Id. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against those who have in-
fringed upon the constitutional rights of another, and states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects... any citi-
zen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights.., secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
131. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 224. The case proceeded to trial on separate causes of
action. See id.
132. See id. In an unreported decision, the district court held that Edwards and Un-
derwood did not demonstrate that the constitutional convention enacted § 182 out of ra-
cial motivations. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed. See Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 621 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 222
(1985). In finding a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the
court of appeals utilized the mixed motive analysis established in Arlington Heights and
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. See id. at 617. Under such
[Vol. 47:675
United States v. Armstrong
The Supreme Court invalidated section 182 on equal protection
grounds.'33 The Court reasoned that both elements of the selective
prosecution claim had been satisfied.3  Direct evidence existed that the
state had enacted the constitutional provision with the intent to disen-
franchise blacks.' Edwards and Underwood also presented evidence
that the state law had a discriminatory effect on blacks as compared to
whites, because blacks were nearly two times as likely as whites to suffer
disenfranchisement under the provision.' The Court, therefore, ac-
knowledged the similarly situated requirement of the discriminatory ef-
fect prong, although it did not precisely identify it as such.137 The Court
held section 182 violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion Clause because the defendants met both prongs of the selective
138prosecution test.
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit held that a racist disposition towards blacks inspired the en-
actment of § 182. See id. at 619-21. The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, held that § 182 vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id at 621.
133. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
134. Cf id. at 227-31 (explaining that the defendants met both the discriminatory ef-
fect and discriminatory intent prongs of their equal protection claim).
135. See id. at 229-31. The evidence of the unjustifiable legislative intent consisted of
the proceedings of the Alabama constitutional convention of 1901, historical studies, and
the testimony of two expert historians. See id. at 229. At trial, an expert historian for the
appellants testified that the 1901 convention aimed to prevent blacks from becoming a
swing vote. See id. at 230. The expert stated that the disenfranchisement of blacks pre-
vented a resurgence of populism and accomplished this aim. See id.
136. See id. at 227. The district court made no finding on the actual discriminatory ef-
fect of § 182. See id. However, the Eleventh Circuit found compelling evidence of dis-
criminatory effect, citing a "registrars' expert" estimate that claimed by 1903, blacks were
ten times more likely than whites to suffer disenfranchisement. See id That same esti-
mate found that as of the time of appeal in two counties blacks were 1.7 times more likely
than whites to suffer disenfranchisement. See id.
137. Cf. id. (noting that the statistical disparity in the impact of § 182 on blacks pro-
vided evidence of the discriminatory effect of that section); see also supra note 136 (ex-
plaining the disparity). Thus, that impact adequately demonstrated a showing of similarly
situated defendants who could have been prosecuted, but were not. See Hunter, 471 U.S.
at 227; see also United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996) (stating that the
defendants produced indisputable evidence that § 182 "had a discriminatory effect on
blacks as compared to similarly situated whites" and, thereby, met the similarly situated
requirement for the selective prosecution claim). Accordingly, the legislative history of
§ 182 and the stark statistical disparity in that section's enforcement provided evidence of
discriminatory intent. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229-31; see also supra note 101 (explaining
the circumstances in which a statistical disparity alone justifies a finding of discriminatory
intent).
138. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
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F. Wade v. United States: Discovery to Bolster a Selective Prosecution
Claim in the Context of Prosecutorial Discretion
The Supreme Court considered a defendant's discovery request for
prosecutorial materials necessary to bolster his selective prosecution
claim in Wade v. United States."9 The issue before the Court was whether
a federal court could review the government's decision not to file a mo-
tion to reduce a defendant's sentence because the defendant had assisted
140the prosecution. In determining the scope of the federal court's review
powers, the Supreme Court also considered whether the government
based its decision on an impermissible consideration.141 The Court held
142
such a decision was reviewable, Furthermore, the Court noted, in dic-
tum, that discovery was appropriate in such a situation if the defendant
demonstrated a threshold showing that an unjustifiable consideration in-
fluenced the prosecutor's decision. 14 Because petitioner Wade did not
meet that threshold showing, he could not obtain discovery. 44
Petitioner Harold Wade, Jr. was arrested on October 30, 1989, when
police found 978 grams of cocaine, two handguns, and more than $22,000
in his residence.1 45 After the search, Wade provided law enforcement of-
ficials with information that led to the arrest of another alleged drug
dealer. 14  A federal grand jury indicted Wade for distributing cocaine
and possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, conspiring to possess
and distribute cocaine, and using or carrying a firearm during a drug
crime, all in violation of federal statutes.47 Wade pled guilty to all
141
counts. Wade received a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years
for the drug counts, and a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for
the gun count. At the sentencing hearing, Wade's attorney suggested
139. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
140. See id. at 183.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 186.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 183.
146. See id.
147. See id. Respectively, Wade was indicted for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21
U.S.C. § 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 183-84. The provision for the mandatory minimum sentence for the
drug counts states in pertinent part:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
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that the court impose a sentence less than the mandatory minimum for
the drug counts to "reward" Wade for assisting the government.5 The
court responded that it could not sentence Wade for less than the manda-
tory minimum, absent a government motion requesting the same. 5'
When no such motion was made, the district court sentenced Wade to
152180 months imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit denied Wade relief
from the sentence imposed, refusing to inquire into the prosecutor's mo-
tives for failing to file a motion requesting a reduction in sentencing.53
On ultimate appeal, the Supreme Court held that constitutional limita-
tions restricted the prosecutor's discretion to submit a motion requesting
sentencing for less than the mandatory minimum. 4  The Court stated
that the "federal district courts have authority to review a prosecutor's
refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion."'55 A defendant, therefore,
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dis-
pense, a counterfeit substance.
(B) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section ... such person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years and
not more than 40 years ....
21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(B) (1994). The provision for the mandatory minimum sentence
for the gun count states in pertinent part:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment
for five years ....
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
150. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 183.
151. See id. The government may file a motion to sentence a defendant below the
mandatory minimum according to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1996).
The section states in relevant part:
Upon motion of the defendant or the Government, or on its own motion, the
court may in its discretion employ any additional procedures that it concludes
will not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.
(e) LIMITED AUTHORITY To IMPOSE A SENTENCE BELOW A STATUTORY
MINIMUM.-Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority
to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence
so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prose-
cution of another person who has committed an offense.
Id. § 3553(d), (e).
152. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 183.
153. See United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 171 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd 504 U.S. 181
(1992). The court of appeals reasoned that such inquiry would unjustifiably invade upon
the prosecutor's discretion. See id. at 172.
154. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 185; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the Fifth Amendment's constitutional limitations on prosecutorial discretion).
155. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185. To review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-
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would be entitled to relief if a prosecutor failed to file such a motion
based on the defendant's race or religion. The Court then held that a
defendant would be entitled to discovery to assist him in preparing the
selective prosecution claim if he made a "substantial threshold show-
ing. '' 117 The Court denied Wade discovery, however, reasoning that
Wade failed to make such a showing because he failed to allege that the
government refused to file a motion based on Wade's race, religion, or
some other suspect reason.
III. UNITED STATES V. ARMSTRONG: SELECTIVE PROSECUTION AND
THE THRESHOLD FOR ITS DISCOVERY
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of discovery in the con-
text of selective prosecution claims in United States v. Armstrong.59 On
April 21, 1992, respondents Christopher Lee Armstrong, Robert Rozelle,
Aaron Hampton, Freddie Mack, and Shelton Auntwan Martin, each of
whom are black, were indicted in the United States District Court for the
assistance motion, federal district courts must find that an unconstitutional consideration
motivated such refusal. See id. at 186; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the Fifth Amendment's constitutional limitations on prosecutorial discretion).
156. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 186.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 186-87.
159. 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
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Central District of Caifornia.o The respondents were indicted on fed-
eral charges of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than
160. See id.; Petitioners Brief at 2, United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)
(No. 95-157). Three months prior to the indictment, from February to April 1992, agents
of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and the Narcotics Divi-
sion of the Inglewood, California police department penetrated the suspected crack ring
through the use of three informants. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483; Petitioners Brief at
3, Armstrong (No. 95-157). On seven different occasions, the informants bought a total of
124.3 grams of crack from respondents and witnessed respondents carrying firearms. See
Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483; Petitioners Brief at 3, Armstrong (No. 95-157). On April 8,
1992, the agents executed warrants to search the hotel room where the drug sales took
place, as well as the residences of some of respondents. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483;
Petitioners Brief at 3, Armstrong (No. 95-157). The agents arrested Armstrong and
Hampton in the hotel room, seized an additional 9.29 grams of crack and a loaded gun,
and subsequently arrested the other respondents as part of the ring. See Armstrong, 116 S.
Ct. at 1483; Petitioner's Brief at 3, Armstrong (No. 95-157).
Because the government decided to prosecute the respondents on federal rather than
state charges, the respondents faced the possibility of greater penalties. Compare 21
U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1994) (explaining federal penalties for various drug offenses), with CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11351.5, 11370 (West 1991) (explaining the California state
penalties for drug offenses). Federal law imposes a mandatory minimum penalty of im-
prisonment for 10 years to life for the crime of possession with intent to distribute crack.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). If a respondent has one prior felony drug conviction, the sentence
increases to a mandatory 20 years-to-life. See id. With two or more prior felony drug con-
victions, the sentence again increases to mandatory life without the possibility of parole.
See id.
Under California state law, the crime for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of
crack carries a sentence of imprisonment for a period of either three, four, or five years.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351.5. A defendant with no prior convictions
may be granted probation. Cf id. § 11370 (citing situations where probation is not avail-
able for individuals with prior convictions). The California State Court may impose an
additional three-year consecutive sentence for each prior felony drug conviction. See id.
§ 11370.2.
In 1986, Congress enacted strict mandatory minimum sentences for narcotics dealers
convicted in federal court in response to growing public concern about drug abuse. See
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 21, and 31 U.S.C.); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, §§ 211-38, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987-2040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98). Since the enactment of the federal mandatory mini-
mums, the disproportionate impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on racial and
ethnic minorities has provoked widespread debate within the federal courts and among
legal scholars and the media. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating that Congress did not act with discriminatory intent in drafting mandatory
minimum sentencing schemes), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 793 (1996); United States v. Clary,
34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that Congress did act in a racially discrimina-
tory manner when it drafted the sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine offenses (citing
United States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 974-76 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1020
(1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1182 (1995); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A
Comment On Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2553-62
(1995) (criticizing the argument that severe penalties for crack offenders benefit law-
abiding members of the black community). But cf Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal
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fifty grams of crack cocaine and conspiring to distribute the same.161 The
respondents also were charged with federal firearm offenses. 62
In response to the indictment, the respondents filed a motion for dis-
covery or, in the alternative, for dismissal."6 The respondents alleged
that race motivated the prosecutor's decision to prosecute them in fed-
eral court.16l The district court granted the respondents' motion for dis-
covery165 on the theory that the evidence contained in the respondents'
affidavit and accompanying study met the necessary threshold require-
ment for discovery in a selective prosecution case. 66
Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1267-69 (1994)
(arguing that stiff penalties for crack offenders benefit the lawful members of the black
community). See generally Ann Devroy, Clinton Retains Tough Law on Crack Cocaine:
Panel's Call to End Disparity In Drug Sentencing Is Rejected, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995,
at Al (discussing President Clinton's support for maintaining stiff federal penalties for
crack cocaine offenses); David G. Savage, Clinton OKs Bill Keeping Stiff Sentences for
Crack, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at A4 (discussing the implications of continuing stiff
federal penalties for crack cocaine offenses).
Federal law punishes crack rock cocaine traffickers much more severely than powder
cocaine traffickers. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY xii-xiii (1995) (stating that a
federal defendant with five grams of crack would receive the same five-year minimum sen-
tence as a defendant with 500 grams of powder cocaine). Another indicator of the dispar-
ity in treatment of black offenders is the fact that white crack dealers are more likely to be
prosecuted in state court where penalties are usually more lenient. See H.R. REP. NO.
104-272, at 19-20 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 352-53. Compounding the
problem is the fact that blacks comprise a majority of crack traffickers. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, supra, at 156, 161.
161. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483 (noting that the respondents were charged with
violating of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), respectively).
162. See id. (noting that the respondents were charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(C) (1994)).
163. See id.
164. See id. In support of their motion, the respondents attached an affidavit by a
"Paralegal Specialist" alleging that during 1991, only black defendants were involved in
the cases closed by the Office of the Federal Public Defender concerning violations of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. See id. Attached to this affidavit, the respondents submitted a
"study" specifying, among other things, each defendant's race. See id. Other defendants
had submitted this study in support of similar discovery motions in at least two other Cen-
tral District cocaine prosecutions. See id. at 1483 n.i. One district court judge, however,
dismissed the study as "statistically insignificant." Id.
Opposing the discovery motion, the government argued that the respondents did not es-
tablish the necessary threshold required for discovery in a selective prosecution case. See
id. at 1484. Specifically, the government argued that the affidavit and accompanying study
did not contain evidence that the government had acted unfairly, or had failed to prose-
cute defendants of other races. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Petitioner's Brief at 4, United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)
(No. 95-157). In support of the respondents' discovery order, the district court considered
significant "the number of cases and the time period covered by the affidavit; the compa-
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The government filed a motion for reconsideration in response to the
district court's discovery order.167 The district court denied the govern-
rable charges involved in each case; and the fact that all defendants were of the same
race." Id.
The district court ordered the government:
(1) to provide a list of all cases from the last three years in which the Govern-
ment charged both cocaine and firearms offenses, (2) to identify the race of the
defendants in those cases, (3) to identify what levels of law enforcement were in-
volved in the investigations of those cases, and (4) to explain its criteria for de-
ciding to prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine offenses.
Id.
167. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484. The government's affidavits and other evi-
dence attached to its motion for reconsideration explained the government's reasons for
prosecuting the respondents, and why the respondents' study did not support the conclu-
sion that the government exclusively prosecuted blacks for federal crack offenses. See id.
Federal and local agents alleged in the affidavits that the respondents' race did not in-
fluence the government's investigation. See id.; Petitioner's Brief at 4, Armstrong (No. 95-
157). The agents also alleged that the case had been chosen for federal prosecution be-
cause the federal drug and firearms offenses "met the U[nited] S[tates}Attorney's guide-
lines for federal prosecution." Petitioner's Brief at 4, Armstrong (No. 95-157). An Assis-
tant United States Attorney explained that the criteria considered in charging decisions
included the following factors: (1) whether the offense met the criteria of the United
States Attorney's guidelines on federal offenses; (2) whether the evidence justified the
charge; (3) whether the case encompassed a "deterrence value" and "federal interest"; and
(4) whether the suspects had criminal histories. See id. at 4-5. Specifically, the Assistant
United States Attorney stated that the decision to prosecute in a federal court in the re-
spondents' cases met the general criteria for prosecution given the amount of cocaine in-
volved, over twice the threshold necessary for imposition of a ten-year mandatory mini-
mum sentence. See id. at 5. The Assistant United States Attorney also found the scope of
the crack ring, involving multiple sales and defendants, relevant to the decision to prose-
cute. See id. Other considerations factoring in the decision included the defendants' addi-
tional federal firearm violations, the respondents' substantial criminal histories, and the
strength of the evidence in the case. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484.
The government also referenced sections of the 1989 Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) report which concluded that "[l]arge-scale, interstate trafficking networks con-
trolled by Jamaicans, Haitians and Black street gangs dominate the manufacture and dis-
tribution of crack." Id. (alteration in original). The government also attached affidavit
from the Public Information Officer for the Los Angeles Division of the DEA and a DEA
report on crack which further stated that particular racial and ethnic groups dominate the
distribution of certain particular drugs due to cultural, historical, and sociological reasons.
See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Armstrong (No. 95-157). The DEA report based its assertions
on evidence of the "sociological patterns of crack use and distribution in the" United
States. Id.
The government accordingly provided an informal survey of Assistant United States At-
torneys in the Central District of California which reported "11 non-black defen-
dants.., indicted on federal crack charges during the period covered by respondents' affi-
davit." Id. at 6; cf. Respondent's Brief at 29, United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480
(1996) (No. 95-157) (arguing that, based on the ethnic nature of their surnames, all of the
11 defendants appeared to be of Hispanic origin).
The government, however, produced no evidence that it had prosecuted a white defen-
dant in federal court for a cocaine-based offense. See id. Although not utilized in the
Armstrong case, there is, indeed, evidence demonstrating the disparity of racial minorities
Catholic University Law Review
ment's motion.'9 Thereafter, the district court dismissed the indictment
because the government indicated that it would not comply with the dis-
covery order.169 On appeal, a divided three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, due
to the inherent concerns in a selective prosecution claim, defendants
wishing to obtain discovery "must provide a colorable basis for believing
that 'others similarly situated have not been prosecuted.
' '
"1 70
The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case, en banc, in order to re-
solve a recent conflict within the circuit over the proper standard gov-
erning discovery by a defendant who raises a selective prosecution
claim.171 In a seven-to-four decision, the en banc panel reversed the
prosecuted in federal court for crack offenses. See United States v. Turner, 901 F. Supp
1491, 1496 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 104 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1566 (1997), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1722 (1997). For example, the United States At-
torney's office in Los Angeles had never prosecuted a white defendant in federal court for
a crack offense as of 1992. See id. A 1992 investigation found that whites were neither
prosecuted in most federal districts, nor had been prosecuted in 17 states for federal crack
offenses. See H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 20 (1995) (noting that of the few white defendants
prosecuted, only eight were convicted of federal crack offenses).
The respondents submitted an affidavit of one of their attorneys in response to the gov-
ernment's motion for reconsideration. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484. The affidavit
purported that there is an equal proportion of white and minority crack users. See id.
(noting that a drug treatment center's intake coordinator supplied this information). The
respondents also submitted an affidavit of a criminal defense attorney alleging that blacks
were much more likely to be prosecuted in federal court for crack offenses, and a newspa-
per article which reported that most black crack offenders were punished more severely
than most white powder cocaine offenders. See id. at 1484 (citing Jim Newton, Harsher
Crack Sentences Criticized as Racial Inequity, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,1992, at Al).
168. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484. The district court concluded, in an unpublished
decision, that the government failed to articulate its criteria for bringing cases involving
crack and firearms offenses into federal court. See Petitioner's Brief at 6-7, Armstrong
(No. 95-157).
169. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484. Curiously, the government suggested that the
district court dismiss the indictments so that it could appeal the discovery order. See
United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1480 (1996). The Supreme Court noted, however, that it had never determined the ap-
propriate remedy for a successful selective prosecution claim. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at
1484 n,2.
170. United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983), affd, 470 U.S. 598 (1985)), rev'd en
banc, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). The court of
appeals determined that the respondents' 24-case study failed to constitute a prima facie
case for selective prosecution because it did not demonstrate that others similarly situated
could have been prosecuted but were not. See id. The court of appeals, instead, deter-
mined that, most likely, the government chose to prosecute the respondents because it be-
lieved they had committed the crimes. See id. at 1437. The alleged protected class status
of the respondents was thereby coincidental. See id.
171. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1510; United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296,
1302 (9th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Redondo-Lemos, the Ninth Circuit held that the
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Ninth Circuit's earlier decision and affirmed the district court's order of
dismissal, holding that "a defendant is not required to demonstrate that
the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated"
in order to obtain discovery.'72 Instead, the en banc panel determined
that discovery is appropriate when a defendant presents evidence pro-
viding a colorable basis for selective prosecution.17 ' The en banc panel
defined the standard as "'some evidence tending to show the essential
elements of the claim.',1 7 4 The en banc panel concluded that the defen-
government could be ordered to provide discovery only upon a prima facie showing of
wrongful discrimination by a defendant. See 955 F.2d at 1302. By contrast, in United
States v. Bourgeois, decided shortly after Redondo-Lemos, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
colorable basis test holding that a prima facie showing of wrongful discrimination was not
necessary. See 964 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 11 (stating that in
most federal circuits, a defendant is required to establish some evidence tending to show
the elements of the selective prosecution claim).
172. Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1516. The court of appeals recognized "that people of all
races commit all types of crimes-not with the premise that any type of crime is the exclu-
sive province of any particular racial or ethnic group." Id. at 1516-17. The court reasoned
that in order to be entitled to discovery of government materials, defendants do not have
to demonstrate selective prosecution. See id. at 1512. The court viewed the evidence nec-
essary to obtain discovery of such materials as "substantially less" than that required to
demonstrate a prima facie case of the charge itself. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id. (quoting United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990)).
"Some evidence" entailed more than a frivolous or conclusory showing. See id. This
showing included the evidence a defendant presented as well as all other evidence pre-
sented to the judge, whether or not presented by the defendant. See id. The court held
that in the face of such evidence the government must have the opportunity to present
evidence that could dispel selective prosecution concerns. See id. Therefore, a judge is to
determine a colorable basis in the context of all the presented evidence. See id. at 1516.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Redondo-Lemos colorable basis standard articulated in
United States v. Bourgeois had been modified. See id. at 1513 (citing United States v.
Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Bourgeois court held that the "high thresh-
old" of the colorable basis standard should rarely justify discovery. See 964 F.2d at 940.
The en banc panel noted that United States v. Bourgeois modified the Rendondo-Lemos
colorable basis standard. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1513.
Second, the en banc panel noted that Bourgeois did not explain the necessary showing a
prima facie case of selective prosecution entailed when the prosecutorial conduct had a
discriminatory effect and purpose. See id. The en banc panel, recognizing that a selective
prosecution claim draws upon ordinary equal protection standards, noted that the demon-
stration of an equal protection claim did not always require a direct showing of discrimina-
tory intent. See id. The court instead found that evidence of discriminatory effect would
support circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. See id.; see also Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (stating that "[c]ircumstantial evidence of invidious intent
may include proof of disproportionate impact"). Thus, the en banc panel held that the
requisite intent and evidence of discriminatory effect necessary to establish a prima facie
case of selective prosecution could be achieved solely by proof of "statistical disparities."
See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1513. The en banc panel rejected the contention that evidence
of similarly situated defendants who could have been prosecuted, but were not, was neces-
sary to demonstrate a prima facie case of selective prosecution. See id. at 1513 n.1.
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
dants presented enough evidence of a colorable basis that the govern-
ment had engaged in selective prosecution.' The en banc panel also af-
Third, the en banc panel concluded that the Bourgeois court did not adequately consider
the evidentiary impediments surrounding the selective prosecution claim. See id. at 1514.
Given the difficulty in obtaining the necessary data to support the claim, the en banc panel
thereby imposed a lesser burden on the defendant. See id. The en banc panel held that to
warrant discovery, defendants must make only good faith efforts to obtain and provide
evidence of a colorable basis. See id. Defendants were, therefore, not required to present
sophisticated statistical "analyses ... that irrefutably demonstrate[d] the existence of
prosecutorial bias." Id.
The en banc panel noted that the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Circuits all required higher showings of discriminatory prosecutions for discovery in selec-
tive prosecution claims. See id. The en banc panel noted that those five circuits permitted
discovery when the defendant introduced evidence that tended to show the essential ele-
ments of the selective prosecution claim and the government failed to refute the defen-
dant's showing. See id.
The en banc panel viewed the pronounced threshold for discovery as best reflecting the
prevailing trend in the law and effectively accommodating the conflicting concerns that
discovery presents in the context of a selective prosecution claim. See id. In doing so, the
en banc court addressed the concern of maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice
system and the separation of powers. See id. at 1514-15; see also supra notes 38-51 and ac-
companying text (discussing concerns of maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice
system and the separation of powers); infra note 226 (illustrating prosecutorial discretion
in the context of separation of powers issues). A defendant has an interest in freedom
from abuse of prosecutorial discretion, whereas the government has an interest in freedom
from judicial oversight in the exercise of that discretion. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1515.
The en banc panel thought that the colorable basis threshold balanced the competing in-
terests of the defendants and the government. See id. Yet, the standard also ensured that
a defendant would not face insurmountable hurdles at the discovery stage. See id. Addi-
tionally, the standard protected the government's prosecutorial discretion from incessant
judicial review predicated upon frivolous selective prosecution claims. See id.
175. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1515. The en banc panel held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by granting the discovery order. See id. Not only did the statistical
evidence suggest that the government disproportionately charge blacks with federal crack
offenses, but the government also failed to refute the inference of racial discrimination in
its prosecutorial decisions. See id. The en banc panel founded its analysis on the premise
that all races commit all crimes. See id. at 1516-17. The en banc panel therefore consid-
ered unnecessary a demonstration that similarly situated persons of other races could have
been prosecuted, but were not, even when the evidence suggested that only certain races
committed certain offenses. See id. at 1517 n.6 (regarding a "'comparison pool"' unneces-
sary "when the record contain[ed] statistical evidence tending to show that only members
of racial or ethnic minority groups have been prosecuted"). The en banc panel viewed the
acceptance of a comparison pool of similarly situated persons of other races akin to the
acceptance and perpetuation of the stereotype that only certain races commit crack of-
fenses. See id.
The defendants presented evidence that only members of a racial minority, specifically
black defendants, were prosecuted on federal crack charges. See id. at 1517. The govern-
ment's evidence that other non-black minorities were prosecuted for federal crack charges
did not refute the study, because the period in which such minorities were prosecuted did
not coincide with the period covered by the defendants' study. See id. The government's
failure to explain or refute the statistical evidence thus entitled the defendants to discov-
ery. See id. at 1519.
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firmed the district court's imposition of sanctions against the government
116for failure to comply with the discovery order. The government ap-
The en banc panel likewise rejected the government's contention that blacks, as a group,
commit crack offenses in greater numbers than other racial groups. See id. at 1518. Such
an assertion, based upon mere generalizations by DEA agents and not "expert sociologi-
cal testimony," did not explain why black violators were more likely than non-black viola-
tors to be prosecuted in federal rather than state court. See id. The en banc panel dis-
missed the government's attempt to justify its charging decisions on race-neutral criteria as
"vague, generalized, and even unspecified" and, thereby, insufficient to rebut the defen-
dants' study. Id. at 1519. Finally, the en banc panel rendered impotent the government's
contention that the defendants failed to present evidence of the government's discrimina-
tory purpose regarding its prosecuting decisions in accordance with the en banc panel's
holding that circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent based solely on statistical
disparities justified discovery. See id
The defendants' study provided enough circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation in the prosecutorial decisions of the government to warrant discovery. See id. The
facts established in the defendants' study, therefore, demonstrated a colorable basis that
the government had engaged in selective prosecution regarding the defendants. See id.
Furthermore, according to the en banc court, the government's inept attempts to refute
the colorable basis of selective prosecution failed to show that the district judge abused
her discretion in the granting of the discovery order. See id. at 1519. The en banc court,
therefore, affirmed the sanction of dismissal due to the government's failure to comply
with the discovery order. See id. at 1520.
176. See id. Concurring in the judgment, Chief Judge Wallace agreed with the en banc
majority that an appellate court should not overturn a district court's discovery order ab-
sent a district judge's clear error of judgment. See id. at 1521 (Wallace, C.J., concurring).
Yet, Chief Judge Wallace rejected the majority's contention that the threshold for discov-
ery in a race-based selective prosecution case should not be "high." See id. at 1520-21.
Chief Judge Wallace believed that the majority should have followed Bourgeois, which
held that a defendant's presentation of some evidence of the elements of a selective prose-
cution claim satisfied the threshold for discovery. See id. at 1520 (citing United States v.
Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1992)). Chief Judge Wallace viewed the majority's
standard, which entitled the defendant to discovery upon a non-frivolous showing of selec-
tive prosecution even absent evidence of similarly situated defendants, as establishing too
low of a threshold. See id. Chief Judge Wallace concluded that judicial oversight of
prosecutorial charging decisions would hinder effective law enforcement. See id. at 1520-
21.
In contrast, the dissent believed that the majority "radically" rewrote selective prosecu-
tion law. See id. at 1522 (Rymer, J., dissenting). First, the dissent rejected the majority's
contention that, in order to demonstrate a prima facie case for selective prosecution, the
"same, insubstantial statistic" of racial disparity could prove both discriminatory effect and
intent. Id. The dissent viewed the majority's reasoning as collapsing the separate and dis-
tinct prongs of selective prosecution. See id. Second, the dissent scorned the majority's
attempt to lower the discovery threshold in a selective prosecution claim that, until then,
explicitly had required the defendant to provide a colorable basis for the existence of dis-
criminatory intent. See id.
Referring to the then-existing conflicting discovery standards in the Ninth Circuit, the
dissent agreed with the majority that a uniform standard should govern the threshold of
discovery in a selective prosecution case. See id. at 1524. The dissent, however, disagreed
with the majority's allegedly severe modification of the Bourgeois "colorable basis" stan-
dard. See id. The dissent thought the holdings of Bourgeois and the majority of the fed-
eral circuits appropriately balanced the government's interest in broad prosecutorial dis-
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pealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the dis-
117
covery issue.
A. The Armstrong Majority: Crushing the Defendant s Chance for
Discovery
In articulating the threshold for discovery in selective prosecution
claims, the Armstrong majority offered a cursory explanation. The Court
reasoned that the justifications for a rigorous standard for selective
prosecution claims required an equally "rigorous standard for discovery
in aid of such a claim. 1 78 In addition, the costs of discovery troubled the
majority.7 9 The Court thought a rigorous threshold for discovery was
cretion against a defendant's interest in freedom from discrimination. See id. at 1525-26.
Also, the high showing on the merits of a selective prosecution claim necessitated the high
threshold of discovery pronounced in Bourgeois. See id. at 1526.
The dissent regarded a high threshold appropriate given the courts' inability to ade-
quately evaluate a prosecutor's charging decisions. See id. The dissent believed steady
judicial oversight of prosecutorial charging decisions inevitably would lead to ineffective
law enforcement. See id. Accordingly, the dissent asserted that a high threshold would
"discourage fishing expeditions, protect legitimate prosecutorial discretion, safeguard gov-
ernment investigative records, and yet still allow meritorious claims to proceed." Id.
(quoting United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1992)). The dissent also
argued that a majority of the circuits had adopted the high hurdle. See id at 1525 n.5; see
also infra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining circuit court holdings regarding the
requisite threshold of discovery in the context of selective prosecution). Summarizing the
high threshold standard asserted in Bourgeois, the dissent stated that Bourgeois followed
the majority view in accordance with Wayte, "appropriately balanc[ing]" the conflicting
interests at stake. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1527. For those reasons the dissent asserted
that the Bourgeois standard should have been affirmed. See id. The dissent believed that
a defendant's evidence of a colorable basis of discriminatory effect and intent warranted
discovery. See id. at 1524. The dissent found that that the defendants' did not satisfy the
colorable basis standard because the defendants' evidence did not meet acceptable stan-
dards of accuracy. See id. (specifically noting the narrow and faulty nature of the defen-
dants' study).
Therefore, the dissent stated that the en banc panel should have denied discovery based
upon the inconclusive data offered by the defendants. See id. Although the dissent ac-
knowledged that the district court's decision concerning the discovery order should not be
disturbed unless an abuse of discretion existed, the dissent would have reversed the district
court's decision. See id. at 1527. Specifically, the dissent maintained that the district court
erred as a matter of law in its misapplication of the selective prosecution standards prom-
ulgated in Wayte. See id.; see also supra notes 98-101, 119-24 and accompanying text (illus-
trating the Wayte standard for a prima facie case of selective prosecution).
177. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995).
178. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1488 (1996). In so stating, the Court
alluded to separation of powers concerns as well as the judicial inability to scrutinize a
prosecutor's decision. See id. at 1486 (stating that "[a] selective-prosecution claim asks a
court to exercise judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive" (quoting
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985))); see also supra notes 38-51 and accompany-
ing text (explaining judicial hesitancy to scrutinize exercises of prosecutorial discretion).
179. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488. The Court maintained that a requirement that
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necessary to combat the many costs imposed on the government; costs
that normally were incurred in response to a defendant's claim of selec-
tive • 180
tive prosecution.
The Court rested its decision on the many federal circuit decisions that
required a showing of similarly situated defendants who were not prose-
cuted." ' The Court stated that a majority of the circuit courts require ashowing of discriminatory effect and intent.' A majority of the courts of
the government assemble documents to refute a defendant's claim of selective prosecution
would divert the government's resources. See id. Such discovery also might disclose the
government's prosecuting strategy. See id.
180. See id.; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (explaining the separa-
tion of powers issues inherent in the judicial review of a prosecutor's decision); supra note
47 and accompanying text (explaining that courts are ill-suited to make such reviews).
181. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
182. See id. (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)); see
also United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[w]here a de-
fendant cannot show anyone in a similar situation who was not prosecuted, he has not met
the threshold point of showing that there has been selectivity in prosecution"); United
States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to order discovery where the defendant did not produce "evidence
as to large numbers of similarly situated persons known to the government who had not
been prosecuted"); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying
discovery because the defendant "did not point to any evidence that others similarly situ-
ated were not prosecuted"); United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 838 (1st
Cir. 1990) (concluding that prosecutors did not treat the defendant, a Puerto Rican
banker, more severely than similarly situated mainland bankers); C.E. Carlson, Inc. v.
SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir. 1988) (refusing discovery because securities dealers
"were unable to show that others similarly situated were not subjected to enforcement
proceedings"); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding the
defendant entitled to discovery of relevant government documents given the evidence that
the government selectively prosecuted blacks in those counties where blacks constituted a
majority of voters), vacated on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (1988); United States v.
Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 418-19 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying the defendant's discovery re-
quest given the lack of some evidence demonstrating others similarly situated who were
not prosecuted); United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying
discovery because the defendant failed to make a non-frivolous showing that others who
were similarly situated had not been prosecuted); United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271,
1277 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a court will grant discovery only if a defendant shows
a colorable basis for a selective prosecution claim, including some evidence that the de-
fendant was singled out for prosecution while others were not); Attorney Gen. v. Irish
People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (asserting that the party raising the selec-
tive prosecution claim has the burden of establishing that others similarly situated have
not been prosecuted); United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding a
defendant's discovery of government documents unwarranted where the defendant did
not establish a colorable claim of selective prosecution); United States v. Berrigan, 482
F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1973) (determining that appellants were not entitled to discovery
because appellants failed to prove a "colorable entitlement" of selective prosecution).
Accordingly, prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit prem-
ised discovery for a selective prosecution claim on "solid, credible evidence" that other
similarly situated offenders had not been prosecuted. See United States v. Bourgeois, 964
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appeals interpreted the words "some evidence" as requiring a showing
that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prose-
cuted, but were not."'
The Supreme Court concluded that the respondents' evidence did not
meet the discovery threshold.' 84 The evidence failed to demonstrate the
threshold because it did not identify similarly situated persons who could
have been prosecuted, but were not.' Respondents had identified only
those prosecuted, omitting evidence of those who were not.'16 The Court
disregarded the respondents' evidence consisting of a newspaper article
and an affidavit of an attorney's conversation with a drug treatment cen-
F.2d 935, 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1992).
The federal circuits have followed the Armstrong restrictive discovery standard. See
United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1425-26 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying discovery be-
cause the defendant failed to demonstrate that the government did not prosecute similarly
situated white offenders who had possessed fewer than 50 grams of cocaine and used a
firearm in connection with a drug offense or had a prior record of drug offenses); United
States v. Berger, 103 F.3d 67, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that discovery, if requested by
the defendant, would have been denied because the defendant failed to demonstrate that
similarly situated offenders of other races committed crack and firearms offenses, but
were not prosecuted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1456 (1997); United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d
739, 745 (4th Cir. 1996) (denying discovery because the defendants failed to demonstrate
comparison statistics that similarly situated whites who committed the same crack offenses
were not prosecuted); United States v. Ochoa-Gutierrez, 95 F.3d 1159, 1159 (9th Cir.
1996) (denying discovery because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the govern-
ment did not prosecute other aliens who illegally re-entered the country); United States v.
Sepulveda, 952 F. Supp 94, 95-97 (D.R.I. 1996) (denying discovery because the defendants,
male members of the Almighty Latin King Nation charged with conspiring to murder,
failed to demonstrate that the government did not prosecute similarly situated female
members of the organization as the evidence showed that the female members offered no
more than "moral support"); United States v. Drake, 934 F. Supp. 953, 958, 964 (N.D. Il1.
1996) (denying discovery because the defendants, who participated in an Agricultural Sta-
bilization and Conservation Service administered by the United States Department of Ag-
riculture and were federally charged with the unlawful disposition of collateral, failed to
demonstrate that other farmers involved in the same government program committed
similar offenses and were not prosecuted); United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp 960, 962,
967 (D.R.I. 1996) (denying discovery because the defendant, charged with racketeering
and conspiring to commit murder and who sought government documents relating to the
justifications for the death penalty, failed to establish that the defendant's race motivated
the government's decision to prosecute, or that similarly situated offenders of other races
were not prosecuted). But cf. United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 23, 25-26 (2d Cir.
1996) (remanding the discovery issue to the district court because the government volun-
teered evidence regarding the number of prosecutions under the federal statute used to
convicted the defendant, which supported the defendant's contention that the defendant's
national origin motivated the government's prosecutorial decision).
183. See supra note 182 (explaining the courts of appeals utilization of the "similarly
situated" standard).
184. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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ter employee as "hearsay and reported personal conclusions based on
anecdotal evidence."'187
The Court also held that Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure did not authorize the discovery of materials to assist the respon-
dents in preparing their selective prosecution claims." The Court found
that Rule 16 applied only to the examination of government documents
for defense against the government's case-in-chief."' Defendants could
utilize Rule 16(a)(1)(C) as a "shield," and not as a "sword," in order to
challenge the prosecution's conduct in a case.' 9° The Court found the
"shield-only" interpretation appropriate in light of the symmetry of the
phrases contained in Rule 16(a)(1)(C): documents "'material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense, and, in the very next phrase,
documents 'intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at
the trial."' 191 Thus, the respondents could not use Rule 16(a)(1)(C) to
discover government documents to support their selective prosecution
claims because such discovery was offensive, not defensive as the Rule
authorized.'9
The Court also asserted that Rule 16(a)(2) established that Rule
16(a)(1)(C) "defense" applied only to responses to the government's
case-in-chief.'93 Thus, according to the majority's understanding of Rule
16, the respondents could examine documents material to their defense
under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), but, under Rule 16(a)(2), they could not exam-
ine the work product of the government in connection with the govern-
ment's case-in-chief, including evidence of selective prosecution.'
187. Id.
188. See id. at 1485 (holding that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) allowed defensive discovery of gov-
ernment documents, for the purpose of a defendant's defense against the government's
case-in-chief, but not offensive discovery, such as a defendant's selective prosecution
claim); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (quoting the language of Rule 16).
189. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485; see also infra notes 190-94 and accompanying
text (defining the Court's "shield-only" analysis).
190. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485. The majority did not cite case law or scholarly
studies to support its contention that Rule 16 applied only to "shield-only" defenses. See
generally id. (stating merely that the text of Rule 16 supported the "shield-only" reading).
191. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C)).
192. See id.
193. See id. Rule 16(a)(2) exempts from discovery, "reports, memoranda, or other
internal government documents made by the attorney for the government or other gov-
ernment agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case." Id.
194. See id. at 1485 (stating that Rule 16(a)(2) defines the scope of "defense" con-
tained in section (a)(1)(C) as a defendant's defense against the government's case-in-chief,
but exempts from that scope government work-product evidence of selective prosecution).
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
In addition to the discovery threshold, the Court defined the test for a
prima facie case of selective prosecution. 95 The Court held that in order
to prove the discriminatory effect prong of selective prosecution, one
must produce evidence that similarly situated offenders were not prose-
cuted.' 96 The Court justified its holding out of concern for separation of
powers and prosecutorial discretion.197 The Court disagreed with the re-
spondents' contention that the prior Supreme Court decisions of Hunter
v. Underwood"99 and Batson v. Kentucky 99 did not require a demonstra-
tion of similarly situated persons.2°° The majority reasoned that although
the Hunter Court did not expressly use the phrase "similarly situated,"
the Court nonetheless relied on evidence that blacks were nearly twice as
likely as whites to be disenfranchised under Alabama's constitution. °'
To the Armstrong majority, this showing amounted to a demonstration
of similarly situated defendants who could have been prosecuted, but
were not.2°2
The majority also deemed Batson consistent with the proposition that
the discriminatory effect requirement entails a showing of similarly situ-
ated defendants. 23 In Batson, the entire jury selection took place before
the judge, who was well-equipped to determine whether an attorney ex-
cluded one group of jurors over another on the basis of an unjustifiable
204
classification. In cases involving peremptory challenges, an inference
of intentional discrimination arises when the facts conclusively demon-
205strate that an attorney excused one group of jurors of the same race.
195. See id. at 1487-88.
196. See id. at 1487.
197. See id. at 1486-87; see also supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text (defining the
nature and scope of the separation of powers issue and the broad grant of prosecutorial
discretion).
198. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
199. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court established the standards for
evaluating a prima facie case of the discriminatory selection of jurors in a criminal trial.
See id. at 96-97. A defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor discriminatorily has
removed jury members of the defendant's race. See id. at 96. The trial court evaluates
evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent under the totality of the circumstances,
including, but not limited to, a "pattern" of peremptory challenges against jurors of a de-
fendant's race, and the type of questioning directed toward jurors of the defendant's race
during voir dire examination. See id. at 96-97.
200. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487-88.
201. See id. at 1487.
202. See id.
203. Cf id. (rejecting the respondents contention that Batson made unnecessary a
demonstration of similarly situated defendants).
204. See id. at 1488.
205. See id.
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Thus, the Court in Armstrong distinguished Batson, explaining that in
jury selection cases, a defendant need not show that members of other
races were retained on the jury given the judge's presence during jury
selection.2°  Thus, the stringent requirements of a selective prosecution
claim's discriminatory effect prong were more akin to the Hunter situa-
tion, where the intent of the alleged constitutional violator remained un-
known, thereby necessitating the need for convincing evidence that the
particular acts had a discriminatory effect, rather than the Batson situa-
tion where the judge could adequately discern the discriminatory re-
moval of jurors.2 7
B. The Concurring Opinions: Breyer Asserts Rule 16 Allows for
Discovery of Government Materials
Both Justices Souter and Ginsburg filed separate concurrences2 8 and
both agreed that Rule 16 was not applicable to selective prosecution
claims.0 9 Justice Breyer's separate concurrence agreed with the majority
opinion to the extent that the respondents failed to make a sufficient
threshold showing for discovery, yet rejected that part of the majority's
holding that a defendant could not invoke Rule 16 in selective prosecu-
210tion claims. In light of Rule 16's plain language, Justice Breyer con-
tended that the Rule did not suggest that items "material to the prepara-
tion of the defendant's defense" covered only those items related to the
government's case-in-chief211
Justice Breyer also acknowledged the validity of the work product ex-I. . .• 212
emption under Rule 16(a)(2), but asserted that it had limitations. The
relevant section of Rule 16 was intended to prescribe the minimum
amount of discovery to which parties are entitled, yet did not intend to
206. See id. (asserting that judges are in the best position to discern patterns of a
prosecution's discriminatory jury selection because such discrimination takes place before
the judge, but that judges are ill-suited to discern a prosecutor's discriminatory charging
decision because such decision takes place outside the judge's supervision).
207. See id. at 1487-88 (asserting that Hunter was compatible with the Armstrong re-
quirements of a selective prosecution claim's discriminatory effect prong, and distinguish-
ing Batson).
208. See id. at 1489 (Souter, J., concurring; Ginsburg, J., concurring).
209. See id. Justice Ginsburg allowed the possibility that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) may apply
in other "defensive" contexts, such as an affirmative defense unrelated to the merits of a
defendant's case. See id.
210. See id. at 1489-92 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
211. Id. at 1490 (noting that the majority's interpretation of Rule 16 lacked "legal sup-
port" (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C))).
212. See id. at 1490 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 239 (1975)).
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limit a judge's discretion to order broader discovery in appropriate
cases. 213 Justice Breyer asserted that judicial discretion permitted courts
to issue discovery orders in the context of a selective prosecution claim.214
Furthermore, Justice Breyer considered Rule 16(a)(2) irrelevant in this
case because the respondents did not seek any work product from the
211government. In Justice Breyer's view, the respondents need only have
met the threshold requirement of Rule 16(a)(1)(C): that discovery be
material to the defendant's defense. 6
C. The Dissenting Opinion: Disparities in Drug Prosecution and Race
Not to Be Dealt with Lightly
Justice Stevens asserted that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in ordering the broad discovery order.17 Justice Stevens contended
that three considerations mandating judicial overview of certain drug
prosecutions allowed for review of the district judge's order.21
Justice Stevens first addressed the high penalties for possession and
distribution of crack. 9 His second consideration dealt with the severity
of treatment on the federal level of crack offenders as compared to pow-
der cocaine offenders.220 His third consideration accepted the fact that
the increased federal penalties for crack offenses disproportionally fell
upon blacks.221 In light of those factors, Justice Stevens argued that the
respondents' evidence presented at trial permitted the district court to
order discovery compelling the government to explain and justify the en-
forcement procedures regarding crack prosecutions involving blacks.2
213. See id. at 1491.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, however, agreed with the
majority that the district judge's power to order discovery for a selective prosecution claim
did not lie in Rule 16. See id. Justice Stevens also agreed with the majority that the re-
spondents' showing did not warrant discovery under either Rule 16 or the judge's discre-
tionary power to grant discovery where appropriate. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 1492-93.
220. See id. at 1493.
221. See id. at 1493-94. Indeed, there is evidence that blacks are subject to the federal
sentencing guidelines for crack offenses more often than whites. Compare id. at 1493
(stating that although whites accounted for 65% of reported crack users in 1993, they
comprised only 4% of federal crack defendants), with SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE & FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 160, at 38-39, 156
(stating that although blacks made up only 38% of those reporting crack use at least once
in 1994, they represented 88.3% of the federal crack offenders).
222. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 47:675
United States v. Armstrong
Justice Stevens thereby rejected the majority's contention that the dis-S• 221
trict court abused its discretion by ordering discovery.
IV. REASON, NOT RHETORIC, SHOULD GUIDE DETERMINATIONS OF
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION CLAIMS
The Armstrong mandate of an arduous threshold standard for discov-
ery in selective prosecution claims can best be explained in light of the
224Court's concerns. 2 First, the Court showed apprehension toward the
separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches;225 and,
secondly, the Court believed that the judiciary was not well equipped to
226review the constitutionally granted discretion of prosecutors. The
Court, therefore, established a stringent threshold of discovery in order
to accommodate these articulated concerns.227
The Court premised its holding on the theory that selective prosecu-
tion entailed a deliberate selection of defendants for prosecution.2 8 De-
223. See id.
224. Cf. id. at 1486-87 (noting that separation of powers concerns surround the review
of selective prosecution claims).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 1486 (stating that federal prosecutors have "broad discretion" to en-
force the nation's criminal laws); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987)
(holding that prosecutors should be granted broad discretion because they, not the courts,
must evaluate the strength of the case, the allocation of resources, and enforcement priori-
ties); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (confirming that the government
retains the discretion to prosecute); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.ll
(1982) (noting a prosecutor's discretion concerning which charges to bring); see also
United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that "separation of
powers concerns prohibit us from reviewing a prosecutor's charging decisions absent a
prima facie showing that it rested on an impermissible basis"); United States v. Chagra,
669 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that the Constitution grants the executive branch
the authority to execute laws). Prosecutors are granted this latitude because they must
help the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Armstrong, 116 S. Ct.
at 1486 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text (demonstrating judicial deference to a prosecutor's charging decisions). This court-
granted discretion, however, has been criticized for its potentially harmful effects. See
Vorenburg, supra note 41, at 1555 (arguing that unchecked prosecutorial discretion raises
the possibility that unjustified criminal sanctions will be imposed more often on the unem-
powered members of society such as minorities and the poor); see also supra note 41 (de-
scribing some of the criticism of the judicial deference granted prosecutors).
227. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487. The rigorous standard of discovery and the
elements of a selective prosecution claim serve to protect the government's charging deci-
sions from incessant judicial scrutiny. See id. at 1488. The arduous discovery standard has
limited the judicial scrutiny of the government's charging decisions because it lessened the
likelihood of frivolous selective prosecution claims. See id.; see also supra note 47 and ac-
companying text (articulating the costs of frivolous selective prosecution claims).
228. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
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fendants, therefore, should be required to present evidence of other
similarly situated offenders in order to demonstrate deliberate selec-
tion. 2  Mere demonstration of a racial disparity in the effect of the gov-
ernment's enforcement of drug offenses does not demonstrate selection,
but rather only that the government prosecuted one group of offenders
for a particular crime more than another group.30
229. See id. at 1489.
230. See id. The Court gave no weight to the respondents' assertion that selective
prosecution had taken place because of racial disparities in the government's enforcement
of federal crack offenses. See id. The Court viewed the Ninth Circuit's premise that
"people of all races commit all types of crimes" as equally preposterous. Id. at 1488-89.
The Court stated that, "[p]resumptions at war with presumably reliable statistics have no
proper place in the analysis of [the] issue." Id. at 1489. Indeed, the Court referred to sta-
tistics confirming the notion that particular crimes can be associated with particular racial
groups. See id. (citing 1994 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 107). Those statistics
demonstrated whites comprised 93.4% of those convicted for dealing LSD and 91% of
those convicted for pornography or prostitution. See 1994 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
ANN. REP. 107. Moreover, 90.4% of those persons sentenced for trafficking crack were
black, 72.9% of those sentenced for trafficking methamphetamines were white, while only
1.6% were black. See id.
Evidence independent of the conviction rate for crack offenses also suggests that blacks
use crack in greater proportion than whites. In 1994, for example, blacks were involved in
"71.5% of emergency room admissions for crack-related problems." Drew S. Days III,
Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution,
48 ME. L. REV. 179, 188 (1996). Accordingly, during that same year, "blacks comprise[d]
over 69% of the admissions for treatment for crack abuse, whereas whites comprised only
24%." Id.
The existence of a racial disparity in federal crack prosecutions is rather apparent.
Blacks comprise 90% of all federal crack defendants, whereas whites, for example, com-
prise about 4%. See Days, supra, at 186. Racial disparities also exist in the arrest rate of
black, as compared to white, offenders. See Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminary
Data on Race and Crack Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 36,
37-38 (1993) (noting that during a two-year period in Los Angeles, 58% of those arrested
for selling crack were black, while the United States Attorney did not prosecute a single
white for a crack related offense).
Moreover, a disparity exists between the percentage of blacks who use illicit drugs in a
given year and those who are arrested for drug crimes. See MARC MAUER & TRACY
HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 12 (1995). In the early 1990s, blacks comprised
only 13% of monthly drug users, but comprised 35% of drug possession arrests, 55% of
drug possession convictions, and 74% of drug possession imprisonments. See id. at 12;
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION
ESTIMATES 1993, at 19 (1994) (reporting that approximately 12.1% of Americans who
used illegal drugs in 1993 were black); F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REP. 235 (1994) (reporting
that 38.4% of those arrested in 1994 for drug crimes were black).
Drew S. Days III, a former Solicitor General of the United States, posited three race-
neutral reasons why a disparity existed between the drug use and arrest rate of black drug
users. See Days, supra, at 187-88. First, the type of drug used could increase the risk of
arrest. See id. at 1487. For example, marijuana users are four-to-nine times less likely to
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As a result of Armstrong, selective prosecution claims will be harder
for defendants to prove given the stringent discovery threshold that de-
fendants must now overcome.23' Yet defendants will not be advantaged
for the simple reason that selective prosecution claims most often are an
ineffectual gamble to defeat criminal charges, with the odds usually
weighing heavily in the government's favor." The Armstrong ruling
merely ensures that defendants frequently will fail to demonstrate a suc-
cessful selective prosecution claim just as defendants have failed consis-
tently in the past.
233
The Armstrong decision, with respect to the prima facie case for selec-
tive prosecution, is consistent with general equal protection analysis
courts invoke to address a defendant's claim of racially motivated ad-
ministration of a facially neutral law.3 The Armstrong Court, however,
be arrested than cocaine and heroin users. See id. Second, the frequency of drug use may
increase the risk of arrest. See id. at 187-88. Additionally, the frequency of drug use of
black drug users is greater than whites. See id. at 188. Thus, the percentage of black drug
users in the black population is probably less than the frequent use of some black drug us-
ers suggests. See id. Finally, the geographic location of drug use may affect the arrest
rates in that area. See id. The risk of arrest for drug users living in an urban area with a
population more than one million people is more than twice as high as the risk for a user
living in a rural county. See id. (stating that the black population is disproportionately
concentrated in large metropolitan areas).
231. Cf Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489 (stating that the majority of the federal circuits
premise discovery for a selective prosecution claim upon a demonstration of similarly situ-
ated defendants of other races who were not prosecuted). In order to obtain discovery for
selective prosecution defendants must now prove that others similarly situated could have
been prosecuted but were not. See id.; see also supra note 182 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the threshold of discovery for a selective prosecution claim).
232. See United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting the rarity
of successful selective prosecution cases resulting in discovery or the dismissal of charges);
Creech, supra note 9, at 394 (noting that the Supreme Court has never overturned a crimi-
nal conviction based on selective prosecution); Romero, supra note 11, at 2053 (stating
that defendants rarely raise successful selective prosecution claims). But cf. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (failing to use the words "selective prosecution" but
reversing the convictions of Chinese laundry operators on the grounds that laundry regula-
tions were enforced almost exclusively against persons of Chinese ancestry).
233. See supra note 232 (explaining the limited success of selective prosecution
claims).
234. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487 (stating that the defendant "must demonstrate
that the federal prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose"') (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985));
see also supra note 9 (demonstrating the development of the two prongs of equal protec-
tion analysis). Commentators have criticized this equal protection standard. See Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Ra-
cism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) (arguing that to require proof of discrimination
through a demonstration of the government's unlawful motive is both unreasonable, given
the onerous evidentiary hurdles such a requirement entails, and irrelevant in that dis-
crimination exists regardless of motive); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Ob-
jective Theory of Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 63 (1994) (purporting that the
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providing that defendants were entitled to discovery only in situations
where the defendant could demonstrate a showing of similarly situated
defendants,35 did not adequately consider the ramifications of the deci-
sion. Of the evidentiary problems that defendants face,236 the Court
back-handedly stated that "the similarly situated requirement does not
make a selective-prosecution claim impossible" for a defendant "to
prove. 2 37 To lend credibility to the claim that defendants have demon-
strated successfully the similarly situated requirement in the past, the
Court relied on Yick Wo, a successful selective prosecution case decided
more than one hundred years ago.2" The Court, however failed to give
specific guidance on how defendants can achieve a successful demonstra-
tion of similarly situated defendants.2 39 Accordingly, the Armstrong
dual-pronged equal protection analysis "devalues important evidence, underrates signifi-
cant voices, establishes less than optimal incentives, and wrongly converts matters of great
institutional complexity into individualistic morality plays"); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine,
Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1318-19 (1995) (suggesting that the
government should be required to rebut the inference of conscious or unconscious racism
in situations where a federal sentencing rule has a disproportionate impact on black de-
fendants); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1031 (1988) (criticizing the dual-pronged equal protection analy-
sis given the difficulty in proving the discriminatory purpose prong); Pamela S. Karlan,
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent,
93 YALE L.J. 111, 112 (1983) (arguing for a less stringent discriminatory intent threshold).
235. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488. The Court justified its "rigorous" standard for
discovery in selective prosecution claims on the basis that the discovery costs imposed a
hardship on the government. See id. Specifically, the government would be forced to root
through its files to compile the requested documents. See id. Selective prosecution claims
therefore divert the government's resources, normally expended on the prosecution of a
defendant, in order to defend against a traditionally futile claim. See id. The government
also risks exposing its prosecutorial strategy through compliance with discovery. See id.
The Court, however, did not explain how defendants should gain the necessary informa-
tion for a selective prosecution claim without discovery of the government's materials. Cf.
id. at 1489 (stating only that respondents could have researched whether similarly situated
persons of other races could have been prosecuted in federal court, but were not). Yet,
the Court did not note how these respondents were to accomplish the task. See id. (as-
serting only that the respondents could have demonstrated that persons of other races
were being treated more favorably than the respondents).
236. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that most evidence of selective prosecution lies in the hands of the government).
237. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
238. See id. Yick Wo successfully demonstrated a selective prosecution claim based on
evidence that only persons of Chinese ancestry were subject to an ordinance making
wooden laundry operations unlawful. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
Since 1886, however, the Supreme Court has never ruled in favor of a defendant's selec-
tive prosecution claim. See Creech, supra note 9, at 394; see also supra note 232 (explain-
ing the limited success of selective prosecution claims at the federal level).
239. See supra note 235 (explaining the Court's curt analysis of the evidentiary prob-
lems defendants face in demonstrating the discovery threshold of a selective prosecution
claim).
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Court did not adequately define the phrase "similarly situated," thereby
leaving its interpretation to the circuit courts.24°
A defendant is placed in a precarious situation regarding the discovery
of governmental materials given the necessity of demonstrating similarly
situated offenders. To be entitled to discovery, a defendant must present
evidence of similarly situated offenders who were treated differently.24'
Defendants usually will need the assistance of government materials in
the first instance because evidence of selective prosecution typically lies
in the hands of the government.242 Thus, to obtain discovery of govern-
ment materials to bolster the defendant's selective prosecution claim, a
defendant first must present evidence of similarly situated offenders,
which is also usually under government control. The selective prosecu-
tion defense, therefore, will remain, for most defendants, only an illusory
opportunity to defeat criminal charges open to those with good fortune
to discover the necessary "similarly situated" evidence.243
240. Cf. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487 (noting that Yick Wo contained a successful
demonstration of the similarly situated requirement). The Court demonstrated the simi-
larly situated requirement by way of analogy. See id. (noting the statistical disparity pre-
sented in Yick Wo regarding the administration of a facially neutral criminal ordinance
which resulted in greater arrest rates of Chinese laundry operators as compared to white
laundry operators). Following the Armstrong decision, the Fourth Circuit ruled on the
requisite showing to demonstrate similarly situated defendants. See United States v. Olvis,
97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th. Cir. 1996). Olvis involved the indictment of two black defendants
for a crack cocaine conspiracy. See id. at 741. The defendants argued that five unindicted
white persons were similarly situated and that, since 1992, more than 90% of those in-
dicted in the Norfolk-Newport News of Virginia area for crack offenses were black. See
id. In rejecting the defendant's claim, the Fourth Circuit held "that defendants are simi-
larly situated when their circumstances present no distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial
factors that might justify making different prosecutorial decisions with respect to them."
Id. at 744.
241. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
242. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority of the relevant evidence of selective prosecution will be found in
the government's possession); see also Romero, supra note 11, at 2049, 2067-68 (asserting
that existing proof of selective prosecution usually is in the government's control). Some
commentators have argued that only through discovery will defendants be provided with
evidence that federal agents or prosecutors were aware of particular offenders yet de-
clined to prosecute them. See Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135,
172 (1996). Prosecutors remain hesitant to cooperate voluntarily regarding a defendant's
selective prosecution claim. See Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educa. Fund, Inc., and
American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13 & n.19,
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (No. 95-157) (discussing efforts of nu-
merous state task forces to investigate racial inconsistencies in prosecutorial patterns).
Some commentators have argued that prosecutorial cooperation is essential given that the
relevant information is rarely available to the public. See id.
243. See Creech, supra note 9, at 415 (stating that the selective prosecution claim
rarely defeats a criminal charge); Romero, supra note 11, at 2049 (stating that defendants
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The Armstrong ruling can best be explained as a natural progression of
the law. Equal protection standards always have guided the prima facie
case for selective prosecution.2 4 The Court in Armstrong did not deviate
from that standard, in that a successful selective prosecution claim on the
merits will include a demonstration of discriminatory effect and discrimi-
natory purpose.245 Accordingly, the threshold for discovery of a selective
prosecution claim is justifiable in that a majority of the circuits require
246the same showing that Armstrong demands.
Judicial respect for the duties of the executive branch also mandates
the rigorous standard for the selective prosecution claim and for its dis-
covery standard.247 The judiciary continues to be wary of judicial activism
and judicial review in situations involving the executive's exercise of its
constitutionally mandated duties.4 8  Thus, defendants are fighting a
nearly impossible battle in the attempt to prove such claims because the
courts will presume that the executive's agents act in good faith out of re-
spect for the constitutional separation of the two branches.249
V. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clauses protect defendants from arbitrary prosecution only upon an ex-
acting demonstration of discriminatory effect and intent. In Armstrong,
the Court affirmed the majority of the circuit courts of appeals in its
analysis of the necessary threshold required for discovery in a selective
prosecution claim. The goal of the Court was twofold: uniformity of the
discovery threshold among the circuits, and continued respect for the
constitutional concerns that accompany the claim of selective prosecu-
tion. Each goal should be achieved through an exacting standard for dis-
covery and the merits of the claim. Although the Court effectively ar-
rarely succeed on selective prosecution claims because the proof required to establish such
claims is difficult to obtain).
244. See supra notes 96-100, 197-205 and accompanying text (explaining the prima fa-
cie case for a selective prosecution claim).
245. See supra notes 96-100, 197-205 and accompanying text (discussing both the dis-
criminatory effect and purpose prongs of the prima facie case for selective prosecution).
246. See supra note 182 (explaining that the majority of the circuit courts require a
showing of similarly situated defendants for a successful demonstration of the discovery
threshold).
247. See supra note 226 (explaining the judicial deference to the government's exercise
of its duty to enforce the nation's criminal laws).
248. See supra note 226 (emphasizing the judiciary's reluctance to interfere with the
prosecutor's charging decisions).
249. See supra note 226 (emphasizing that separation of powers concerns prevent the
judiciary from infringing on executive branch powers).
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ticulated the necessary threshold for discovery, the Court did not venture
an opinion as to how such evidence might be obtained to overcome the
threshold. As a result, the Court's pronounced test for discovery may be
so exacting as to moot the effectiveness of the selective prosecution claim
itself.

